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ABSTRACT 
THE IMPACT OF MATERIAL WEAKNESS PRESENTATION STRUCTURE AND 
INTERNAL CONTROL TERMINOLOGY ON INVESTOR PERCEPTIONS 
MAY 2018 
MATTHEW WAYNE STARLIPER, B.S., BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
M.S., BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor M. David Piercey and Professor Yao Yu 
Management is required to disclose any material weaknesses discovered during its 
evaluation to prepare the company’s financial statements in their internal control over 
financial reporting (ICFR) report. Across two experiments, I examine the impact of two 
presentation characteristics of a material weakness made up of multiple, smaller 
problems— (1) the structure of the presentation of the material weakness, which is 
whether the material weakness is identified first, followed by descriptions of its 
individual parts (Top Down structure) or vice versa (Bottom Up structure) and (2) 
whether or not the parts of the weakness are labeled with ICFR terminology (“significant 
deficiencies” vs. “issues”). In my first experiment I find evidence that presenting the 
material weakness last, in comparison to presenting the material weakness first, increases 
the perceived number of distinct problems that investors perceive in a company’s ICFR, 
but I ultimately do not find that this structure significantly impacts investors’ perceptions 
of investment desirability. In my second experiment, I specifically examine how using 
(versus not using) ICFR terminology to identify the parts of the material weakness impact 
investors’ perceptions of the severity of the material weakness and how the presentation 
viii 
 
structure moderates that relationship. I find that using ICFR terminology increases the 
perceived overall severity of the weakness, although the effect of presentation structure is 
insignificant. I also find that using ICFR terminology negatively affects the investment 
desirability of a company through two separate paths—ICFR terminology increases (1) 
the perceived number of distinct problems in ICFR and (2) the perceived severity of the 
individual parts of the material weakness. Both of these paths increase the perceived 
severity of the material weakness, which then decreases investment desirability. Lastly, 
providing a definition for the ICFR terminology (i.e., an explanation that “significant 
deficiencies” are relatively less severe deficiencies than material weaknesses) does not 
impact the effect of ICFR terminology on perceptions of weakness severity.  
Keywords: internal control over financial reporting; material weakness; significant 
deficiency; presentation format. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) mandated a number of reforms regarding 
a company’s disclosure of internal control over financial reporting (ICFR). In particular, 
section 404a of SOX requires companies filing periodic financial statements with the 
Securities and Exchange Committee (SEC) to include a report that specifies 
management’s responsibility for establishing and maintaining internal controls and  
assesses the effectiveness of the internal control structure (U.S. House of Representatives 
2002). The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the impact of one aspect of this 
ICFR report over which management has much discretion: the presentation of a material 
weakness when ICFR is deemed to be ineffective, in particular when the material 
weakness is the result of multiple, smaller deficiencies. I examine how changing the 
presentation structure of a material weakness and how using ICFR terminology to 
identify the parts of the material weakness impact investors’ perceptions of the severity 
of the material weakness. I also investigate mechanisms through which these aspects of 
material weakness presentation impact investors’ perceptions of the overall severity of 
the material weakness and, ultimately, the desirability of the company as an investment. 
It is important to examine this issue because management’s report on ICFR can 
vary dramatically in presentation and content from firm to firm. The SEC requires few 
disclosures in the ICFR report beyond stating management’s responsibility over ICFR, 
the framework with which management evaluated ICFR, and management’s conclusions 
on the effectiveness of ICFR (SEC 2003). This statement is particularly true when a 
company’s internal control system is ineffective as management has great latitude in 
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describing the details of the control deficiencies and/or weaknesses (Rose et al. 2010; 
Tadesse 2015; Tan and Yu 2018). Because the disclosure of ineffective ICFR has a 
negative impact on companies (Hammersley et al. 2008; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009), it 
is important to understand how management’s discretion over different disclosure 
presentations of material weaknesses may differentially impact investors’ perceptions of 
the company’s ICFR. The presentation of this weakness can be structured to highlight 
either the overarching weakness or the individual parts of the weakness. Additionally, 
when a material weakness is the result of a number of less severe deficiencies, the parts 
of this weakness can be labeled with ICFR specific terminology (e.g., “significant 
deficiency”) or with terminology that is not unique to the ICFR context (e.g., “issues”, 
“factors”, etc.; see Appendix A for examples of different presentations of material 
weakness that vary in their terminology use and structure from actual ICFR reports). I 
conduct two studies to examine how these two aspects of the presentation of a material 
weakness made up of smaller control deficiencies impact investor perceptions of a 
company. 
In my first study, I examine how the presentation structure of the material 
weakness impacts investors’ perceptions of the desirability of a company as an 
investment. Relying on partition dependence theory in psychology (Pelham et al. 1994; 
Fox, Bardolet, et al. 2005), I predict that, absent any extra internal control instruction, a 
presentation structure that highlights the individual parts of a material weakness (or a 
Bottom Up structure) leads investors to perceive more internal control problems within 
ICFR, which leads investors to infer the material weakness to be more severe and reduces 
the investment attractiveness of the company as opposed to a structure that highlights the 
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overarching material weakness (or a Top Down structure). I also examine an intervention 
that provides investors with extra instruction concerning ICFR. This intervention explains 
to investors that it is the possibility of misstatement rather the number of issues that 
makes a weakness material. This intervention should reduce the impact of presentation 
structure on the perceived number of internal control problems by helping investors move 
away from the automatic processing caused by how the parts are structured (Monga and 
Bagchi 2012). 
I perform a 2 × 2 + 2 between-subjects experiment using MBA students as 
proxies for non-professional investors to test my predictions. I manipulate the 
presentation structure variable as whether the material weakness as a whole is first 
disclosed after which the parts of the weakness are described (Top Down structure), or 
the individual parts of the material weakness are first disclosed and then are described 
together as a material weakness (Bottom Up structure). I also manipulate whether or not 
the participants receive the instruction that I explained previously. 
First, I find evidence that, absent the internal control instruction, investors believe 
more strongly that there are multiple, distinct problems in ICFR when the material 
weakness is presented with the Bottom Up structure than when it is presented with the 
Top Down structure. Additionally, I find that this effect is moderated by the presence of 
the instruction insomuch that the impact of presentation structure on the perceived 
number of problems in ICFR is reduced. To test how material weakness presentation 
structure impacts the investment desirability of the company, I construct a model that 
theorizes that material weakness presentation structure impacts investment desirability 
through its effects on the perceived number of problems in ICFR and the perceived 
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severity of the material weakness. Conducting structural equation modeling (SEM), I 
initially find evidence that the Bottom Up (as opposed to Top Down) structure has a 
significantly negative indirect effect on investment desirability; furthermore, I find that 
this indirect effect is moderated by the internal control instruction. However, this indirect 
effect becomes insignificant based on an updated model where both the relationship 
between presentation structure and the perceived number of problems and between the 
perceived number of problems and perceived overall severity are free to vary with 
instruction    
In my second study, I examine another aspect of the presentation of a material 
weakness: the terminology used to identify the parts of the weakness. Based on prior 
research on technical jargon (Jardine and Hrudey 1997; Oppenheimer 2006) and the 
inherent affect associated with words (Warriner et al. 2013), I predict that using ICFR 
terminology (as opposed to using non-ICFR specific terminology) will increase investor 
perceptions of the severity of each individual parts of the material weakness because the 
affect inherent to the ICFR terminology (e.g., “significant deficiency”) is perceived to be 
more negative than non-ICFR terminology (e.g., “issues”, “factors”, etc.) (Warriner et al. 
2013). Moreover, based on the previously mentioned partition dependence theory 
(Pelham et al. 1994; Fox, Bardolet, et al. 2005), I predict that the effect of ICFR 
terminology on perceptions of material weakness severity will be moderated by the 
presentation structure of the material weakness. A Bottom Up presentation structure 
should increase the differences in perceptions of severity when ICFR terminology (as 
opposed to non-ICFR terminology) is used because this structure leads investors to 
perceive there to be more distinct internal control problems within ICFR, which 
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highlights the negative affect inherent to the ICFR terminology. On the other hand, a Top 
Down presentation structure leads investors to perceive fewer distinct internal control 
problems because they fall under the overarching material weakness umbrella, which 
could reduce the impact that the terminology has on overall perceptions of the severity of 
the weakness. Finally, I predict that ICFR terminology will impact investors’ perceptions 
of the investment desirability of the company through its impact on the perceived severity 
of each individual parts of the weakness and the overall severity of the material weakness 
and that this indirect effect will be moderated by presentation structure.  
I perform a 2 × 2 + 2 between-subjects experiment using MBA students as 
proxies for non-professional investors to test my predictions. I manipulate ICFR 
terminology by using either a term that is unique to the context of ICFR (“significant 
deficiency”) or a common-use English term (“issues”). I manipulate presentation 
structure using the two structures described in my first study: the Top Down structure or 
the Bottom Up structure. Finally, as an additional analysis I add two experimental groups 
where participants in both the Top Down and Bottom Up conditions are provided a 
definition of the ICFR terminology (i.e., “significant deficiency” + definition).  
Consistent with my prediction, I find that investors perceive a material weakness 
to be more severe when the parts of that weakness are identified as “significant 
deficiencies” rather than “issues.” Contrary to my expectations, however, I do not find 
that presentation structure moderates this effect or impacts investors’ perceptions of the 
number of distinct problems in ICFR. Instead, I find that identifying the parts of the 
material weakness as “significant deficiencies” (as opposed to “issues”) significantly 
increases the perceived number of distinct problems in ICFR. One potential explanation 
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to this unexpected finding is that semantically unique words (such as “significant 
deficiencies”) in a specific context tend to be more “distinct” to readers (Schmidt 1985; 
Schmidt 1991). This distinctness may lead investors to evaluate the parts of a material 
weakness individually rather than as a whole. Moreover, words with negative 
connotations lead readers to put more attention and processing into those words 
compared with neutral words (Schmidt and Saari 2007), which also suggests that labeling 
the parts of a material weakness as “significant deficiencies” as opposed to “issues” 
increases the perceived number of distinct problems in ICFR.  
I conduct a SEM analysis to test how using ICFR terminology impacts the 
investment desirability of the company. I find that ICFR terminology has two 
significantly negative indirect effects on investment desirability. On the one hand, 
identifying the parts of the weakness as significant deficiencies (as opposed to issues) 
increases the perceived number of distinct problems in ICFR, which increases the 
perceived overall severity of the weakness, which in turn decreases investment 
desirability; on the other hand, identifying the parts of the weakness as significant 
deficiencies (as opposed to issues) increases the perceived severity of each of the 
individual parts of the weakness, which increases the perceived overall severity of the 
material weakness, which in turn decreases investment desirability.   
Finally, I do not find that providing investors with the definition of the ICFR 
terminology used in the report (i.e., significant deficiency) differentially impacts 
investors’ perceptions of the severity of the weakness even though providing the 
instruction does increase investors’ understanding of the difference in severity between 
material weaknesses and significant deficiencies.  
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These studies present a number of contributions to theory and practice. First, these 
studies contribute to the growing number of accounting studies that examine how 
management’s discretion over the disclosure of internal control issues impacts investors’ 
judgements and decisions. Prior research has found that the amount of details in a 
material weakness disclosure  (Rose et al. 2010), the degree of responsibility that 
management accepts for the material weakness (Tan and Yu 2018), and the degree to 
which the material weakness is disaggregated (Tadesse 2015)1 influence investors’ 
perceptions of the company. I contribute to this stream of research by showing that the 
language used in an ICFR report, such as the specific terminology, impacts investors’ 
perceptions of the company while keeping the description of the material weakness 
constant. 
This dissertation also contributes to the psychology literature by answering a call 
for research investigating different ways that influence how people subjectively partition 
a multi-part issue (Fox, Bardolet, et al. 2005).  The results of my second study suggest 
that people partition a multi-part issue based on the terminology used to label the 
individual parts. Prior research has found that people partition a multi-part issue based on 
the partition structure suggested to them, such as the number of parts suggested, the 
visual placement of the parts, or even narrative suggestions of the grouping of the parts 
(Benartzi and Thaler 2001; Fox and Rottenstreich 2003; Fox and Clemen 2005; Shah and 
Oppenheimer 2011). However, as far as I am aware, no study has yet found that merely 
                                                          
1
 Tadesse (2015) focuses on the effect of a physical disaggregation of a material weakness into its parts 
(moving from a description of a single material weakness to a description of a material weakness with 
separately identified control deficiencies, which involves a change in content of the material weakness 
description) while my study focuses on how presentation structure and ICFR terminology impact the 
conceptual partitioning of the weakness (i.e., a conceptual disaggregation) while keeping the content of the 
description of the weakness the same. 
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changing the label attached to the individual parts influences the number of distinct parts 
people perceive in a multi-part issue.   
While my first study found evidence that presentation structure impacted how 
participants partitioned the material weakness, I did not replicate those results in my 
second study. Therefore, the conclusions that I can draw about presentation structure’s 
influence on subjective partitioning are limited. One potential reason that this result was 
not replicated in my second study is that participants in my second study had a 
significantly larger amount of professional work experience than those in my first study. 
It is possible that people with more work experience have learned how to access and 
analyze information necessary for their decision making so that they are less affected by 
partition structure as those without that experience. I leave to future research to examine 
whether professional work experience or other conditions may influence how 
presentation structure may affects how people partition a multi-part issue. 
My second study also contributes to practice because its implications should be of 
interest to the management of public companies that issue ICFR reports and also to 
financial regulators who care about investor behavior. To public company management, 
this study shows that using ICFR-specific terminology when disclosing a material 
weakness made up of multiple smaller deficiencies can lead to negative investor 
reactions. My study also informs management that providing the definitions of ICFR 
terminology may not be beneficial, in terms of influencing investors’ reactions to the 
material weakness disclosure, even though it does increase investors’ understanding of 
the difference in severity of different deficiency types.  Regulators should find my study 
informative because I show that management’s discretion in disclosing specific 
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information about a material weakness influences investors’ judgments and decisions. 
Specifically, management could improve the perception of a disclosed material weakness 
by merely changing the labeling of the parts of the weakness. Relatedly, regulators 
should be interested to know that investors do find information about the deficiencies that 
make up a material weakness useful in their evaluation of a company’s ICFR, which may 
lead regulators to consider additional regulation about the type of information 
management should be required to disclosure about a material weakness in ICFR. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I provide 
some background information and a literature review concerning ICFR reports. In 
Chapter 3, I present the hypotheses, methodology, and results of Study 1. In Chapter 4, I 
present the hypotheses, methodology, and results of Study 2. Finally, I present my 
conclusions in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 2  
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Internal Control over Financial Reporting 
ICFR includes those company policies and procedures that are meant to give 
assurance to outside investors of the reliability of the financial information provided by 
company; these controls provide investors assurance by reducing the risk of recording 
inappropriate or inaccurate transactions due to error or fraud (SEC 2003). Weak internal 
control systems increase the risk that investors make financial decisions based on 
materially misstated information. Prior research has shown that firms with weaker ICFR 
experience higher abnormal accruals, inherent risk, and information risk than firms with 
stronger ICFR because weaker ICFR suggests a high level of information uncertainty 
present in a firm’s publicly available financial information (Ashbaugh‐Skaife et al. 2008; 
Hogan and Wilkins 2008). 
The SOX  provisions requiring companies to assess and report the effectiveness of 
their ICFR give investors an extra signal with which to assess the future profitability and 
cash flows of a company, which impacts their investing decisions (Lambert et al. 2007). 
Prior research has found that the market considers these signals informative, more so 
when ICFR has been assessed to be ineffective (Schneider et al. 2009).  Research has 
found that disclosing ineffective ICFR leads to stock price decreases (Beneish et al. 2008; 
Hammersley et al. 2008; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009) and increased equity and debt cost 
of capital (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009; Dhaliwal et al. 2011). These studies suggest that 
companies are incentivized to find ways to reduce these negative consequences of 
disclosing ineffective ICFR. In this dissertation, I examine how different ways of 
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presenting a material weakness can influence investors’ perceptions of this negative 
signal.  
The SEC develops specific rules on how companies should comply with section 
404a of SOX. Regarding management’s report on ICFR, the SEC requires management 
to (1) state that they have the responsibility to establish and maintain adequate ICFR, (2) 
identify the internal control framework used by management to evaluate the effectiveness 
of ICFR, (3) conclude on the effectiveness of ICFR for the fiscal period and disclose any 
material weaknesses discovered, and (4) include a statement that a registered public 
accounting firm attested to management’s evaluation of ICFR (SEC 2003).2 Additionally, 
the SEC prohibits companies from concluding that their ICFR is effective if one or more 
material weaknesses are identified in the report (SEC 2003). It is important to note that 
companies are not required to disclose less severe internal control deficiencies such as 
significant deficiencies and control deficiencies, and firms that do disclose such 
deficiencies do so voluntarily (Doyle et al. 2007). There is little other guidance given to 
companies concerning the content to present in the report or how to present the content of 
the ICFR report.  
Because companies face negative consequences of disclosing material weaknesses 
and regulators require little in terms of presenting material weaknesses, it is important to 
understand how different ways of presenting a material weakness influences investors’ 
perceptions of the company. 
 
                                                          
2
 SOX section 404b requires public companies to have an independent external auditor attest to the 
conclusions made by management in their section 404a report.  Non-accelerated filers (those with public 
float under $75 million) were permanently exempted from the SOX 404b requirement for an external 
auditor to attest to management’s 404a report by the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 (SEC 2010).   
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2.2 The Presentation of a Material Weakness Made Up of Multiple Parts 
 The SEC specifically defines a material weakness as “a deficiency, or a 
combination of deficiencies, in ICFR such that there is a reasonable possibility that a 
material misstatement of the registrant’s annual or interim financial statements will not be 
prevented or detected on a timely basis” ( Securities and Exchange Commission 2007a, 
17).3 This definition highlights that a material weakness does not have to be just one 
major deficiency; rather, it can be made up of a number of individually less severe 
deficiencies that have the combined effect of a material weakness (see also PCAOB’s AS 
2201.65). While management is required to disclose any material weaknesses in its ICFR 
report, the rules established by the SEC do not specify how or to what extent 
management should disclose these material weaknesses, especially when a weakness is 
made up of multiple, less severe deficiencies.  
  In this dissertation, I focus on the situation where the firm has to disclose a 
material weakness which is made up of multiple parts. Prior research has found that the 
amount of details in a material weakness disclosure  (Rose et al. 2010), the degree of 
responsibility that management accepts for the material weakness (Tan and Yu 2018), 
and the degree to which the material weakness is disaggregated (Tadesse 2015) influence 
investors’ perceptions of the company. In my dissertation, I examine two presentation 
features of material weaknesses made up of multiple, smaller parts:  the presentation 
structure of the material weakness and the terminology used to identify the parts.  
 
 
                                                          
3
 As described by the PCAOB, a deficiency “in internal control over financial reporting exists when the 
design or operation of a control does not allow management or employees, in the normal course of 
performing their assigned functions, to prevent or detect misstatements on a timely basis” (AS 2201.A3). 
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CHAPTER 3  
STUDY 1 
3.1 Hypothesis Development 
3.1.1 Presentation Structure and the Perceived Number of Issues within ICFR 
Research in psychology has found that when people evaluate a multi-part issue, 
they subjectively partition the issue into subgroups based on the partition most accessible 
to the individual (Fox and Rottenstreich 2003; Fox et al. 2005a). This is known as 
partition dependence theory. The main findings from this “partition dependence” research 
are that people’s judgments and decisions are impacted by how they perceive the 
partition of the issue under evaluation and that the partition people perceive can be 
influenced by how information is presented to them (Fox and Levav 2004). Research 
suggests that adoption of the partition tends to be automatic in that people accept and 
utilize the partition initially presented to them (Fox and Clemen 2005). These findings are 
robust and have been replicated in numerous experimental contexts including probability 
judgments, investment allocations, attribute weighting, financial aid distributions, and 
charitable giving (Weber et al. 1988; Benartzi and Thaler 2001; Fox and Rottenstreich 
2003; Fox et al. 2005b).  
In this first study, I examine how the presentation structure of the material 
weakness and the parts which make it up can act as a conceptual partition of the material 
weakness. In the Top Down structure, the material weakness is first disclosed and the 
parts of the weakness are then described. In this case, investors are less likely to perceive 
a partition because first disclosing the material weakness acts as an “umbrella” under 
which the parts of the weakness are then grouped. Under this umbrella, the parts of the 
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weakness could be more strongly inferred to be related to a similar issue (Steyvers et al. 
2003), which could lead to a perception of fewer distinct problems for management to 
face within ICFR. On the other hand, in the Bottom Up structure, the parts of the 
weakness are disclosed first and then are described together as a material weakness. 
Because there is no initial higher-level “umbrella” for the parts to be grouped under, 
people will automatically create multiple partitions in the weakness because the parts 
appear to be more separated. The multiple partitions are automatically adopted; therefore, 
it is much harder to group them under the material weakness “umbrella” ex post, which 
could lead to a perception of more distinct problems within ICFR.  This discussion leads 
to my first hypothesis: 
 H1a: Absent other instruction on ICFR, investors will perceive a higher number 
of problems in ICFR when the material weakness is presented in the Bottom 
Up structure than in the Top Down structure. 
3.1.2 Intervention to Avoid Unconscious Partitioning 
 Because research suggests that the adoption of a specific partition tends to be an 
automatic, unconscious process (Fox and Clemen 2005), I investigate a strategy to help 
investors move away from automatically creating the partitions in the Bottom Up 
structure so that the material weakness presentation structure has a reduced impact on the 
perceived number of problems. The strategy I develop is a short intervention (“the 
instruction”) that explains to investors that it is the possibility of misstatement rather the 
number of issues that makes a weakness material. Prior research suggests that when there 
are multiple, hierarchical levels at which a subject can be partitioned, people can move 
away from using low order partitions , which in this case represent the individual parts of 
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the weakness, by helping them develop abstract mindsets (Monga and Bagchi 2012). I 
predict that providing the instruction will help investors consider the overall picture of 
the material weakness and how the parts come together to form the weakness rather than 
rely on the lower order partitions to infer the number of problems in ICFR. Therefore, the 
instruction should moderate the effect I predict in H1a so that there is a weaker 
relationship between the presentation structure and the perceived number of problems in 
ICFR.  My next hypothesis is formally stated as follows: 
H1b: Providing the instruction to investors will moderate the effect of material 
weakness presentation structure on the perceived number of problems in 
ICFR so that the perceived number of problems in ICFR differs less 
between presentation structures. 
 H1a and H1b jointly predict a two-way interaction between presentation structure 
and instruction. The graphical depiction of H1a and H1b is shown in Figure 1. 
3.1.3 Impact of Presentation Structure on Investment Desirability 
3.1.3.1 Effect of Perceived Number of Problems on Weakness Severity 
I predict in my first hypotheses that material weakness presentation structure will 
impact investors’ perception of the number of problems in ICFR. I further predict that 
material weakness presentation structure will have a negative effect on investors’ 
perceptions of the desirability of the company as an investment through its effect on the 
perceived number of problems in ICFR and the perceived overall severity of the material 
weakness.  
Research in psychology has generally found that individuals tend to infer the size 
of an object or the likelihood of an event by the number of subunits into which it is 
16 
 
divided, particularly when individuals are motivated to be accurate and the task is 
difficult (Petty and Cacioppo 1984; Pelham et al. 1994; Pelham and Neter 1995; Burson 
et al. 2009). In the context of ICFR disclosure, the perceived number of problems in 
ICFR is the subunits into which the material weakness can be divided. Therefore, as the 
perceived number of problems in ICFR increase, the perceived “size” (i.e., severity) of 
the material weakness increases.  
Investors tend to use this number of issues to infer the severity of the ICFR 
problems because investors face challenges with understanding how the internal control 
problems that management discloses may ultimately impact the financial statements 
(Lambert et al. 2007). For example, investors need to know how seriously the internal 
control failures weaken the reliability of the information in the financial statements and 
how easily or effectively management will remediate the failures. Unfortunately, such 
information is usually not readily available from management’s report, and investors 
have to infer these conclusions from the facts (i.e., evidence) management presents in its 
ICFR report. 
As a result, investors (and non-professional investors in particular) should find 
evaluating an ICFR report to be a uncertain task because they do not clearly understand 
how the conclusions of the report may impact the financial statements (Arnold et al. 
2011). With the uncertainty and difficulty in evaluating a company’s ICFR and its 
impact, investors are more likely to infer the severity of the ICFR problems in a heuristic 
way. Therefore, I expect that as the perceived number of problems in ICFR increases, the 
perceived severity of the material weakness will increase.    
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3.1.3.2 Effect of Weakness Severity on Investment Desirability 
 I expect that investors will use the severity signals they perceive from the 
company’s ICFR reports in their judgments of the desirability of the company as an 
investment. Management’s disclosure of an internal control issue represents a signal of 
the potential threat to the reliability of a company’s financial information (Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. 2009). Lambert et al. (2007) hypothesize that investors’ beliefs about a 
firm’s future cash flows depends in part on the quality of the accounting signal disclosed 
by management. Internal control issues that a firm discloses increases the noise of the 
firm’s accounting signal, and investors respond to the increased noise by requiring a 
higher cost of capital because of doubt that the expectations of future cash flows will be 
met. Therefore, I expect that the investment desirability of a firm decreases as the 
perceived severity of the material weakness increases.  
3.1.3.3 Path Structure to Investment Desirability 
 Based on my predictions from H1 and the causal paths I predicted above, I 
theorize a model where material weakness presentation structure impacts the perceived 
number of problems in ICFR, which impacts the perceived overall severity of the 
material weakness which in turn impacts the investment desirability of the company. 
Furthermore, the indirect effect of structure on investment desirability will be moderated 
by the internal control instruction because the perceived number of problems path is 
moderated by internal control instruction. My predicted theoretical model is shown in 
Figure 2. My second hypothesis is formally stated as follows: 
H2: Material weakness presentation structure will have a significantly negative 
indirect effect on investment desirability through the perceived number of 
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problems in ICFR and the perceived overall material weakness severity, and 
this indirect effect will be moderated by internal control instruction. 
3.1.4 Research Question 
While not the focus of this study, I examine the effect of an additional 
“paragraph” level of structure, where the material weakness and the parts of the weakness 
are presented in a single paragraph of prose (rather than in bullet-point format in which 
my Top Down and Bottom Up levels are operationalized). Prior research in psychology 
has shown that more visibly distinct groupings (e.g., bullet-point lists) increase the 
number of partitions people create when evaluating a subject than less visibly distinct 
groupings (Fox and Clemen 2005). Therefore, it is possible that moving from a paragraph 
structure of ICFR disclosure to a bullet-point format may increase the perceived number 
of problems in ICFR because of the more visibly distinct parts of the weakness in the 
bullet-point format.  
A recent study (Tadesse 2015) examines the impact of disaggregating a material 
weakness by manipulating disaggregation as either prose or as a bullet-point list and finds 
evidence that presenting the material weakness in a bullet-point format improves the 
impression of the company as an investment. My study is different from Tadesse (2015) 
in that I specifically examine how the paragraph vs. bullet-point structures impact the 
perceived number of problems in ICFR, which is not examined in that study. It is 
possible that moving from a paragraph structure to a bullet-point structure negatively 
impacts investment desirability because of the increase in perceived number of problems 
while at the same time moving to the bullet-point structure may increase desirability for 
another reason (i.e., increase management credibility as in Tadesse 2015). Therefore, it is 
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still unclear how the prose-paragraph versus bullet-point format affects investors’ 
perceptions of the number of problems within ICFR. 
R1: Does a prose style material weakness disclosure differentially impact the 
perceived number of problems within ICFR than a bullet-point style 
disclosure? 
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Design and Participants 
 I conducted a 2 × 2 + 2 between-subjects experiment with presentation structure 
(Top Down, Bottom Up) and internal control instruction (absent or present) as my 
manipulated variables with paragraph structure (with the instruction absent or present) as 
the +2 cells. I used professional MBA students from a large public university in the U.S. 
as participants in my study. MBA students have been found to be suitable surrogates for 
non-professional investors because they perform similarly to non-professional investors 
on non-complex tasks (Elliott et al. 2007). Non-professional investors are an appropriate 
population with which to study the impact of material weakness presentation structure 
because there is evidence that management’s ICFR reports, in particular those that 
disclose ineffective ICFR, are more informative to small/non-professional investors than 
to professional investors (De Franco et al. 2005; Arnold et al. 2011).  
 The MBA students were offered course credit to participate in the study. I 
collected a total of 128 usable responses.4 The MBA participants were 38.3 percent 
female, had an average age of 33.7 years, had an average of 10.2 years of professional 
work experience, and had taken an average of 2.1 accounting classes (all untabulated).   
                                                          
4
 A total of 134 MBA students participated in the study. I removed six observations because these 
participants indicated that they had already participated in this same survey for credit in another class (i.e., 
these six individuals were each enrolled in two of the classes I solicited for participation for Study 1). . 
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3.2.3 Task and Procedures 
Participants were sent a recruitment email inviting them to take part in the study 
with details of the class credit they would receive for completing the study. The students 
clicked on a link provided in the email and were brought to a Qualtrics© survey (see 
Exhibits 1-24 in Appendix D to see the survey on the Qualtrics© platform). Participants 
then indicated their consent to participate in the study. Participants were told that they 
were to assume the role of a general investor evaluating a public U.S. company named 
Griffin Inc., and they were told that they would be asked to make investing decisions and 
assess the severity of the internal control issues facing the company.  
 In the first section of the task, participants read the background information about 
Griffin and its products. They read selected financial information for the past three years. 
Next, participants read analyst forecast about the company, followed by stock price data 
over the past year, both of which suggested volatility in the company’s performance and 
uncertainty concerning the future prospects of the company.  
 The next part of the task introduced the internal control instruction variable. First, 
all participants read a definition of a material weakness regardless of condition. Then, 
depending on the condition, participants either read no other instruction (instruction 
absent condition) or an extra instruction (instruction present condition; see Appendix B 
for exact wording of the instruction). After reading these instructions, participants were 
asked a comprehension check question that quizzed them on the instruction they just 
received (no comprehension check question was given in the no instruction condition), 
and participants could not continue the task until they answered the question correctly. 
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Forcing participants to answer the question correctly helped to ensure that they 
understood the instruction before moving on. 
 Participants were then shown management’s report on ICFR. All participants read 
about management’s responsibility for establishing and maintaining ICFR and that 
management determined that ICFR was not effective as of the end of the fiscal year. At 
this point I introduced the presentation structure manipulation, and participants read 
about the material weakness with the Top Down, Bottom Up, or paragraph structure 
according to their assigned conditions, respectively. Finally, all participants read that 
management is committed to remediating internal controls and that the independent 
auditor conducted its own evaluation and identified the same weakness (the auditor’s 
report is not included in the case). For the second and third sections of the task, 
participants responded to questions regarding the primary dependent variables and 
demographic variables. 
3.2.4 Independent Variables 
  My first independent variable is material weakness presentation structure. I note 
here that I keep the information of the individual details of the weakness constant in all 
three levels of the variable. I have included all three levels of the presentation structure 
variable in Appendix B. For the Top Down structure, the material weakness is identified 
first, followed by descriptions of its individual parts (in bullet-point format). For the 
Bottom Up structure, the parts of the weakness are described first (in bullet point format), 
which are then summarized into one material weakness. Finally, the paragraph structure 
(which is the +2 of my experimental design) is similar to the Top Down structure in that 
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the material weakness is first identified after which the issues are described, but the entire 
presentation is presented as prose (i.e., without bullet points).  
 My second independent variable is internal control instruction. See Appendix B 
for the exact wording of the instruction. The first level is the control condition where no 
extra instruction is presented to investors. The second level presents the instruction which 
informs investors that several issues that combine to a material weakness are not 
necessarily any more or less severe than a material weakness and that the number of 
internal control issues is not what makes a weakness material, but rather how together 
they make it reasonably possible for a material misstatement to exist in the financial 
statements.  
3.2.5 Dependent Variables 
 The main variable of interest for H1 involves investor perceptions of the number 
of issues that management faces in their ICFR. To measure this variable, I asked 
participants the extent to which they agreed with two statements on a scale from 0 
(“Definitely disagree”) to 10 (“Definitely agree”): “Griffin mainly faces one issue within 
their internal controls” and “Griffin mainly faces multiple, distinct issues within their 
internal controls” (emphases as in the instrument). The wording of the statements and the 
range of the scale helped to avoid demand effects (e.g., participants respond based on 
what they think the experimenter wants) so that participants responded with their own 
interpretation of the facts of the case.  I ran a factor analysis for these two questions. 
They were highly correlated and had a high degree of reliability (Pearson correlation = 
0.79, p < 0.001; Cronbach’s alpha = 0.881), and the two questions loaded onto a single 
factor (hereafter referred to as “Problems”), which explains 89.5 percent of the variance. 
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The variables of interest for H2 involve investor perceptions of the severity of the 
material weakness and the investment desirability of the company. To measure the 
former, I asked participants to indicate the overall severity of the weakness on a scale 
from 0 (“Not severe at all”) to 10 (“Extremely severe”). Additionally, I asked participants 
to consider the likelihood of a material misstatement in Griffin’s financial statements on a 
scale from 0 (“Low likelihood”) to 10 (“High likelihood”). These two questions were 
highly correlated and had a high degree of reliability (Pearson correlation = 0.60, p < 
0.001; Cronbach’s alpha = 0.75), and the two questions loaded on a single factor 
(hereafter referred to as “Severity”), which explains 80.1 percent of the variance.  
To measure the investment desirability of the company, I asked three questions 
that have been used in previous studies of investor behavior. First, I asked participants 
about their willingness to invest in the company’s stock on a scale from 0 (“Absolutely 
not willing to invest”) to 10 (“Absolutely willing to invest”) (Elliott et al. 2015). 
Participants were then asked to assume that they already held the company’s stock and 
decide how they might change their investment on a scale from -5 (“Significantly 
decrease”) to 5 (“Significantly increase”) (Tan and Yu 2018). Finally, I asked participants 
their opinion as to how the company’s stock price will change as a result of the control 
weakness disclosure on a scale from -5 (“Significant decrease”) to 5 (Significant 
increase) (Rose et al. 2010).  The three questions concerning investment desirability had 
a high degree of reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.76) and loaded onto a single factor 
(hereafter referred to as “Desirability”), which explains 68.5 percent of the variance. 
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3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Hypothesis Tests 
3.3.1.1 Test of H1 
 H1 concerns the effect of the structure and instruction manipulations on investor 
perceptions of the number of internal control problems management faces in ICFR.5 The 
focus of my analysis is on the effect of the Top Down and Bottom Up structures on the 
perceived number of problems in ICFR. I will discuss the paragraph structure cells in 
section 3.3.2.2. The means for Problems for the Top Down/Bottom Up and 
Instruction/No Instruction cells are graphically shown in Figure 3. Descriptive statistics 
for Problems are found in Panel A of Table 1. Results for the hypothesis tests are 
presented in Panel B and C of Table 1. 
H1a and H1b jointly predict a two-way interaction between presentation structure 
and instruction. I conduct an ANOVA with Structure (Bottom Up and Top Down) and 
Instruction (Instruction or No Instruction) as the independent variables and Problems as 
the dependent variable. Panel B of Table 1 shows the results of this ANOVA. Results 
show a significant interaction between Structure and Instruction (p = 0.009, one tailed).  
In H1a, I predict that, without any extra internal control instruction, the Bottom 
Up structure would lead participants to perceive a higher number of problems in the 
company’s ICFR. To test H1a, I tested the simple effect of Structure on Problems when 
                                                          
5
 Initial analyses showed that Problems severely violated normality assumptions in many of the 
experimental cells as determined by a Shapiro-Wilk test of normality (the p-values following the order of 
cells A, B, C, D, E, and F of Table 1 are: <0.001, 0.453, 0.001, <0.001, 0.015, 0.004). A visual inspection 
of the data showed the presence of outliers. I calculated a Cook’s Distance statistic (which is a measure for 
influential outliers) for each observation. Six observations (one from each experimental condition) had a 
Cook’s D greater than 4/n, which is a cutoff found in previous research to represent very influential outliers 
(Bollen and Jackman 1985). I removed these observations from my sample, which greatly reduced the 
normality violations for Problems ( the p-values following the order of cells A, B, C, D, E, and F of Table 1 
are: 0.019, 0.930, 0.088, 0.072, 0.107, 0.013). Removing these observations left me 122 observations for 
my analysis (see Table 1).  
25 
 
no instruction is given. Panel C of Table 1 shows the result of this test. Consistent with 
H1a, the effect is positive (means: 0.264 vs. -0.200) and the contrast is significant 
(p=0.018, one-tailed). This result supports H1a by providing evidence that the Bottom Up 
(as opposed to Top Down) structure causes participants to feel more strongly that 
management faces multiple, distinct problems in their ICFR.  
In H1b, I predict that providing participants with the extra instruction would 
moderate the effect predicted in H1a so that the impact of structure on Problems would 
be reduced. As I showed previously, the interaction term of the ANOVA test was 
significant, which suggests that the effect of Structure does change when the instruction 
is given. To further test H1b, I tested the simple effect of Structure on Problems when 
instruction is given. Consistent with H1b, there is no statistically significant effect of 
Structure on Problems (means: 0.120 vs. 0.389; p-value = 0.208), which suggests that the 
instruction does reduce the effect of structure on the perceived number of distinct 
problems in ICFR. However, the direction of the moderation is different than I 
anticipated. I originally predicted that the perceived number of problems in ICFR in the 
Bottom Up structure would decrease with instruction (see Figure 1), but as can be seen in 
Figure 3, the perceived number of problems in ICFR in the Top Down structure increases 
when the instruction is given. I discuss this result further in section 3.3.2.1. 
3.3.1.2 Test of H2 
 In H2, I predict that structure would impact the investment attractiveness of a 
company (i.e., the Desirability variable) through its effects on the perceived number of 
problems in ICFR and the perceived overall severity of the material weakness and that 
this effect would be moderated by the extra instruction. In order to test this hypothesis, I 
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create a structural equations model using SPSS AMOS to test the theoretical model 
presented in Figure 2. The results of that model are presented in Figure 4. The model has 
good fit statistics (χ2: p=0.350; GFI=0.969; CFI=0.993; RMSEA=0.038), which suggests 
that the model fits the data well (see Kline 2011).  
 The results show that structure (the Bottom Up structure vs. the Top Down 
structure) is positively associated with Problems (estimate=0.464, p=0.015, one tailed), 
and the instruction moderates that relationship, as evidenced by the negative estimate on 
the interaction term (estimate=-0.734, p=0.007, one tailed). Problems is positively 
associated with Severity (estimate=0.338, p=0.002, one tailed), which suggests that as the 
number of problems participants perceive increases, their perceptions of the severity of 
the material weakness increases. Finally, Severity is negatively associated with 
Desirability (estimate=-0.520, p<.001, one tailed), which suggests that as participants 
perceive the material weakness to be more severe they find the company to be less 
attractive as an investment.  
 Next, I test whether the indirect effect of structure on Desirability through 
Problems and Severity, when no instruction is given, is significant. AMOS calculates the 
indirect effect (equivalent to multiplying the coefficients of paths a, c, and d from Panel 
A, Figure 4) using 10,000 bootstrapped samples. Results for the indirect effect are shown 
in Panel B, Figure 4. I find that the indirect effect of presentation structure on 
Desirability through Problems and Severity is significantly negative (estimate=-0.082, 95 
percent of bootstrapped estimates < -0.0216
, 7). This represents the indirect effect of the 
simple effect of structure when no instruction is given. 
                                                          
6
 If  zero is not within 95 percent of the 10,000 indirect effect estimates, the indirect is determined to be 
significantly different from zero (Preacher and Hayes 2008; Hayes 2013). 
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To test that this significant indirect effect is moderated by the instruction, I test 
whether the interaction term of structure and instruction in my SEM analysis has a 
significant indirect effect on Desirability through Problems and Severity. Hayes (2015) 
suggests that the indirect effect an interaction term in a SEM model represents an index of 
moderated mediation, or in other words, a test of whether the indirect effect of an 
independent variable is significantly moderated by another variable. If the indirect effect 
of the interaction term is significant, there is evidence of moderated mediation in the 
model. Results of this test are also found in Panel B, Figure 4. I find that the interaction 
term of structure and instruction has a significant, positive indirect effect on Desirability 
through Problems and Severity (estimate=0.129, 95 percent of bootstrapped estimates > 
0.044). If I combine the negative indirect of the of the simple effect of structure when no 
instruction is given (-0.082) with the positive indirect effect of the interaction term 
(0.129), I get an indirect effect that is much closer to zero (0.047), which represents the 
indirect effect of the simple effect of structure when instruction is given. This shows that 
while presentation structure produces a negative effect on investment desirability when 
no instruction is given, the instruction effectively negates the negative impact that 
structure has on investment desirability, which is consistent with H2.  
3.3.2 Supplemental Analyses 
3.3.2.1 Simple Effect of Instruction 
 In H1b, I predict that the instruction moderates the effect of structure on the 
perceived number of problems in ICFR. This moderation can occur in two ways. First, 
the moderation can come from a decrease in the perceived number of problems in the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
7
 All bootstrapped confidence intervals reported here were bias-corrected. 
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Bottom Up condition when the instruction is present versus absent. The purpose of the 
instruction is to help participants in the Bottom Up condition refrain from merely 
counting the number of problems but consider how the problems come together to form a 
single material weakness. Second, the moderation can also come from an increase in the 
perceived number of problems in the Top Down condition when the instruction is present 
versus absent. The instruction makes participants more aware of the partition of the 
problems, which may have been overlooked by participants in the Top Down condition 
when the instruction is absent.  
 I use the simple effect of instruction to test the two possibilities mentioned above, 
I find that the perceived number of problems significantly increases in the Top Down 
condition when instruction is present compared to absent (means: 0.389 vs. -0.200; p = 
0.006, untabulated). The number of problems does not differ between the Bottom Up 
conditions that does or does not include the instruction (means: 0.120 vs. 0.246; p = 
0.510, untabulated)8.  
These results show that instruction moderates the effect of structure on the 
perceived number of problems occurs by increasing the perceived number of problems in 
the Top Down condition, rather than by decreasing the perceived number of problems in 
the Bottom Up condition. This result provides evidence to support my theory that people 
tend to accept the partition given to them unconsciously (Fox and Clemen 2005) because 
the results show that, without the intervention, people accept the partitions, or more 
correctly the lack thereof, suggested with the Top Down structure; however, with the 
inclusion of the intervention, even though it was aimed at reducing the number of 
                                                          
8
 These statistics are based on the ANOVA model in Table 1. 
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perceived partitions, people think differently of the material weakness so that they 
perceive there to be more partitions with the Top Down structure.  
3.3.2.2 Paragraph Structure 
  To investigate R1, I compare the paragraph structure level to the Top Down 
structure level with a separate 2 × 2 ANOVA, with instruction as the other independent 
variable. The Top Down and paragraph structures are the most similar because they both 
present the material weakness first and then describe the parts of the weakness last. An 
analysis of the simple effects show that there is no statistical difference between the 
paragraph and Top Down structures whether the instruction is absent (means: 0.080 vs. -
0.200; p=0.171, untabulated) or present (means: 0.151 vs. 0.389; p=0.272, untabulated). 
Based on this analysis, there is little evidence of an effect between these two levels of 
structure. Multiple reasons may explain this null effect. It is possible that the difference in 
format (prose vs. bullet points) is dominated by the Top Down structure as the paragraph 
structure can also be regarded as a prose-style Top Down structure. It is also likely that 
differences beyond presentation format, including issues related to readability (Tan et al. 
2015), play a role here. Future research can continue to explore this issue of paragraph vs. 
bullet-point disclosure. 
3.3.2.3 Alternative Model and Analysis 
 In H2, I predict that the presentation structure will have a significantly negative 
indirect effect on investment desirability through the perceived number of problems in 
ICFR and the perceived overall material weakness severity, and this indirect effect will 
be moderated by internal control instruction. In the model that I used to test this 
hypothesis (see Figure 2), I only allow the relationship between Bottom Up and Problems 
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(path “a”) to vary based on whether or not the instruction is given; I constrain paths “c” 
and “d” to not differ based on whether the instruction is given. The rationale behind this 
model is that the instruction intervention helped participants avoid automatically 
partitioning the material weakness, but I did not anticipate ex-ante that the instruction 
would impact the step after partitioning (i.e., path “c”). 
 However, it is possible that the intervention  impacts the relationship between 
perceptions of the number problems and overall severity of the weakness because while 
the intervention aims to reduce the partitioning effect of structure, it also suggests to 
participants that the number of problems they perceived may not be important to their 
evaluation of the severity of the material weakness, which can result in a weakened 
relationship between perceived number of problems and material weakness severity. 
Therefore, the relationship between the perceived number of problems and the overall 
severity (path “c”) should be allowed to vary with instruction.    
I present the updated model in Figure 5. Specifically, I allow both path “a” and 
path “c” to vary with instruction. I use the multi-group analysis feature in SPSS AMOS to 
test whether the model fit improves after allowing paths “c” and “d” to vary with 
instruction. Results show that the updated model has a marginally significant better fit 
compared to the original model (df = 1; χ2 difference = 2.881; p-value = 0.09; 
untabulated)
 . Because the model with the unconstrained path “c” has a better fit, I use 
this updated model to re-estimate the indirect effect of presentation structure on the 
investment desirability of the company. The multi-group analysis feature also allows me 
to examine the paths from Bottom Up vs. Top Down to Desirability through Problems 
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and Severity individually for each of my two Instruction conditions. The results of the 
analysis are presented in Figure 59.  
Path “a” of Panels A and B in Figure 5 are similar to results already discussed 
previously. Path “a” in Panel A, which is the effect of structure (Bottom Up vs. Top 
Down) on the perceived number of problems in ICFR when no instruction is given, has 
the same coefficient as in the original analysis in Figure 4 (estimate = 0.464; p-value = 
0.021, one tailed). The coefficient on Path “a” in Panel B, which is the effect of the 
Bottom Up structure on the perceived number of problems in ICFR when the instruction 
is given, is the same as the simple effect of the Bottom Up structure on Problems when 
the instruction is given that I discuss in the results for H1 (see section 3.3.1.2; estimate = 
-0.270; p-value = 0.166).  
Path “c” of Panels A and B in Figure 5 is where the results from this model 
deviate from those in Figure 4. In Panel A, I do not find that the perceived number of 
problems is associated with the perceived overall severity of the material weakness when 
no instruction is given (estimate = 0.146; p-value = 0.310). However, in Panel B, I do 
find strong evidence of a statistically significant relationship when the instruction is given 
(estimate: 0.535; p-value = 0.002). These results suggest that the significant relationship 
that I find between the perceived number of problems and perceived overall severity of 
the material weakness in my original model primarily results from the condition where 
participants receive the instruction. The direction of this coefficient is opposite my initial 
belief about how the instruction may impact the relationship between perceived number 
of problems and overall severity of the material weakness. In section 3.3.2.1, the results 
                                                          
9
 Fit statistics for the model in Figure 5 are generally good; χ2 p-value=0.519; GFI = 0.962. Other indices 
are not interpretable because the χ2 statistic is less than df: CFI = 1.00; RMSEA = 0.00.  
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suggest that the instruction may increase the salience of the partitioning of the material 
weakness; therefore, it may be that the instruction also strengthens rather than weakens 
participants’ belief about the importance of the number of perceived problems on 
judgments of the severity of the material weakness. 
Finally, I test whether the indirect effect of structure on Desirability through 
Problems and Severity is significant in the two Instruction conditions. The results in 
Panel C show that there is no evidence of a statistically significant indirect effect of 
structure on Desirability when no instruction is given (estimate: -0.036, 95 percent 
bootstrapped confidence interval between -0.162 and 0.014, which includes zero in the 
interval) or when instruction is given (estimate: 0.076, 95 percent bootstrapped 
confidence interval between -0.017 to 0.245, which includes zero in the interval).10 
Changing the model I use to test H2 changes the conclusions that I can draw about how 
the presentation structure of the material weakness impacts investors’ perceptions of the 
investment desirability of a company.   
3.4 Discussion 
 In my first study I examined how ways of structuring the presentation of a 
material weakness and the parts that make up that weakness impact investors’ perceptions 
of the number of issues that management faces in their ICFR, and how this effect flowed 
through to impact the perceived severity of the material weakness and investors’ financial 
                                                          
10
 Using the multi-group analysis function in SPSS AMOS, I tested the indirect effect of the Bottom Up 
structure on Desirability through Problems and Severity when both of the coefficients on paths “c” and “d” 
were constrained to be the same between Instruction conditions. This analysis is analogous to the analysis 
of my original model described in section 3.3.1.2 and shown in Figure 4. The indirect effect when no 
instruction was given was qualitatively similar to this same indirect effect shown in Figure 4, which 
suggests that the type of analysis (the multi-group analysis function) was not the cause of the contradictory 
results between the original and updated models.  
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judgments. I also examined how providing investors with an internal control instruction 
moderated the effect of material weakness structure on investors’ perceptions. 
  I found that, absent extra internal control instruction, investors perceived there to 
be more distinct internal control problems in ICFR when the material weakness was 
structured in such a way that the individual parts of the material weakness were first 
disclosed and then were described together as a material weakness (Bottom Up structure) 
compared to a structure where the material weakness as a whole was first disclosed after 
which the parts of the weakness were described (Top Down structure). Giving 
participants an internal control instruction that discussed how smaller internal control 
problems can aggregate to a material weakness moderated this effect by increasing the 
perceived number of issues in ICFR when the material weakness was presented in the 
Top Down structure. My results provide evidence that participants tended to 
automatically adopt the partition suggested by the presentation of the material weakness 
grouping and that they could move away from automatically adopting the suggested 
partition (albeit in an unexpected manner) when given an instruction that encouraged a 
deeper consideration of the material weakness and its parts. 
I also initially found that the Bottom Up structure (vs. the Top Down structure) 
had a statistically significant negative indirect effect on investment desirability through 
the perceived number of internal control problems and perceived severity of the material 
weakness and that this indirect effect was moderated by the inclusion of the internal 
control instruction.  
However, this indirect effect becomes insignificant based on an updated model where 
both the relationships between presentation structure and participants’ perceived number 
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of problems and participants’ perceived number of problems in ICFR and participants’ 
perceived overall severity of the material weakness could vary with instruction.  
 In conclusion, this study provides mixed results. While my finding that 
presentation structure can impact how people partition a material weakness is interesting 
and is a contribution to the psychology literature of partition dependence theory, my lack 
of evidence of a significant indirect effect between presentation structure and investor 
perceptions and judgments brings into question how informative my results are to 
accounting practice. My second study examines another aspect of ICFR presentation, the 
terminology used to identify the parts of a material weakness, and how presentation 
structure may moderate terminology’s impact on investor perceptions of material 
weakness severity and investing desirability of a company. 
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CHAPTER 4 
STUDY 2 
4.1 Hypothesis Development 
4.1.1 ICFR Terminology 
 Section 404 of SOX requires management to assess ICFR and report its 
conclusions on ICFR effectiveness as of the end fiscal year in their annual financial 
statements (SEC 2003). During this assessment, management may discover control 
deficiencies, which occur “when the design or operation of a control does not allow 
management or employees, in the normal course of performing their assigned functions, 
to prevent or detect misstatements on a timely basis” (AS 2201.A3). Management must 
then use judgment to determine the magnitude of the potential misstatement that could 
result from the deficiency: a deficiency that has the potential to cause a misstatement that 
is material in magnitude is identified as a material weakness, and a deficiency that has the 
potential to cause a misstatement that is significant in magnitude (but not material) is 
identified as a significant deficiency (Messier et al. 2017).11  
 This discussion illustrates that ICFR assessments and reporting involve a great 
deal of context-specific terminology. The language and vocabulary involved with 
disclosing internal control weaknesses within ICFR represent a form of accounting jargon 
because they involve accounting terms that have very specific definitions in the context 
of ICFR that are probably not understood by those untrained in the context and may be 
misunderstood because the terms have a plain English meaning that differs outside of the 
                                                          
11
 The SEC defines a significant deficiency as “A deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in internal 
control over financial reporting that is less severe than a material weakness, yet important enough to merit 
attention by those responsible for oversight of the registrant’s financial reporting” (Securities and Exchange 
Commission 2007b). 
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ICFR context (Jardine and Hrudey 1997; Oppenheimer 2006; Castro et al. 2007). 
Investors come from diverse backgrounds and most likely do not fully understand the 
intricacies of ICFR or the differences between the types of deficiencies and how they 
may ultimately impact the financial statements. For example, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
(2009) do not find evidence that investors react differently to the disclosure of material 
weaknesses or less severe deficiencies, and the authors suggest that this result may be 
because investors are uncertain about how to distinguish the different deficiency types, 
indicating that investors perceive different ICFR terminologies to have similarly negative 
connotations. One implication of this research is that investors may rely on other 
contextual clues about a subject, such as how they feel about it, when they do not 
understand the meaning of the subject in its specific context.  
 Prior research in accounting and psychology has found that affective contextual 
information can impact people’s decision making (Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999; Kida et al. 
2001; Moreno et al. 2002).  Therefore, investors are may react to the affect inherent to 
particular words and incorporate that affect in their perceptions of a material weakness. 
Warriner et al. (2013), a study in psychology, examined the affective valence of 
thousands of different English-language words, including the words “deficiency” and 
“issue”, which are common terms to refer to the parts of a material weakness in ICFR 
reporting. Using their data, I found that people perceive word “deficiency” to have 
greater negative valence than the word “issue” (which is the term I use in my experiment 
to represent non-ICFR terminology).12  I predict that disclosing the parts of the material 
                                                          
12
 Words were rated on a scale from 1 (negative valence) to 9 (positive valence). Using the data that the 
Warriner et al. (2013) made available online, I performed a two-sample t-test and found that the word 
“deficiency” is perceived to be more negative than the word “issue” (means: 2.74 vs. 3.95; t=-2.25; 
p=0.015, one tailed). 
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weakness with an ICFR specific terminology (i.e., significant deficiency) rather than a 
common-use English term (e.g., issue, factor, etc.) will increase the perceived severity of 
the material weakness because the context-specific ICFR term has an inherent affect that 
is more negative than the common-use, non-ICFR one. However, as I discuss below, the 
impact of using ICFR terminology on perceptions of material weakness severity may 
depend on the presentation structure of the material weakness in the ICFR report. 
4.1.2 Interaction of ICFR Terminology and Presentation Structure 
I examine the same two material weakness presentation structures that I examined 
in Study 1: the material weakness is disclosed first after which the parts that make up the 
weakness are described (“Top Down”), or the parts that make up the weakness are 
described first after which they are described together as a material weakness (“Bottom 
Up”) (see Appendix A for anecdotal examples of ICFR using combinations of ICFR 
terminology and presentation structures). 
As I did in Study 1, I utilize partition dependence theory in psychology to 
hypothesize how presentation structure will impact investor perceptions. As a review, the 
main findings from partition dependence research are that people’s judgments and 
decisions are impacted by how they perceive the partition of the issue under evaluation 
and that the partition people use can be influenced by how information is presented to 
them (Fox and Levav 2004). Research suggests that adoption of the partition tends to be 
automatic in that people accept and utilize the partition initially presented to them but 
then may update the partition as they learn new information (Fox and Clemen 2005).  
Similar to Study 1, I posit that material weakness presentation structure will act as 
a conceptual partition of the material weakness, and that this conceptual partition will 
38 
 
moderate the effect of ICFR terminology on perceptions of severity. In the Top Down 
structure, describing the material weakness first acts as an “umbrella” under which the 
parts of the weakness are then presented. This ”umbrella” leads to a perception of fewer 
partitions because the parts of the weakness could be more strongly inferred to be related 
to a similar issue (Steyvers et al. 2003; Shah and Oppenheimer 2011), which could lead 
to a perception of fewer distinct problems within ICFR. Unique to this study is how the 
conceptual partition caused by presentation structure may impact the terminology used to 
identify the parts of the material weakness. The terminology used to identify the parts 
may not matter as much to investors’ perceptions when the parts of the weakness are 
under this “umbrella” of the overall material weakness in the Top Down structure 
because investors perceive the parts to belong to a single underlying problem in ICFR. 
Therefore, the impact of the more negative ICFR terminology on the overall severity of 
the weakness will be less under the Top Down structure. 
On the other hand, in the Bottom Up structure where there is no initial higher-
level “umbrella” for the parts to be grouped under, people will automatically create 
multiple partitions in the weakness because the parts appear to be more separated, which 
could lead to a perception of more distinct problems within ICFR. With the Bottom Up 
structure, the use of ICFR terminology should matter to a greater extent because the 
terminology used to identify the parts of the weakness becomes more salient as investors 
perceive the parts of the weakness to be more distinct, which leads to greater perceptions 
of overall severity when the more inherently negative ICFR specific terminology 
identifies the parts of the weakness. This discussion leads to my first hypothesis, and the 
graphical depiction of H3 is shown in Figure 6: 
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 H3:  Investors will perceive the material weakness to be more severe when the 
parts of the weakness are labeled with ICFR terminology than with non-
ICFR terminology; this effect will be stronger when the material weakness 
has a Bottom Up than Top Down structure. 
4.1.3 Impact of Terminology and Structure on Investment Desirability 
 I predict in my third hypothesis that using an ICFR term to identify the parts of 
the material weakness increases the perceived severity of the material weakness in the 
Bottom Up structure but that this effect would be reduced in the Top Down structure. In 
this section, I expand and extend that hypothesis to describe how ICFR terminology may 
impact the investment desirability of a company and how presentation structure 
moderates that relationship. I also hypothesize how presentation structure itself may 
separately impact the investment desirability of the company. 
4.1.3.1 Path from ICFR Terminology to Perceived Weakness Severity  
I posit that identifying the parts of the material weakness with an ICFR specific 
term will increase the overall perceived severity of the material weakness because the 
affect inherent to the ICFR term is more negative than a non-ICFR specific term that is 
more affect neutral, and each  of the parts of the material weakness will be evaluated as 
such. Specifically, I predict that this severity evaluation occurs on the individual 
deficiency level. For example, identifying an internal control problem as a “significant 
deficiency” will make it appear worse than if it were referred to as something with a more 
neutral connotation such as “issue”. As investors perceive each of the individual parts of 
the weakness to be more severe, their perception of the overall severity of the weakness 
will increase. However, as I hypothesized in H3, material weakness presentation structure 
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could moderate this relationship. As I discussed previously, the terminology used to 
identify the parts of the material weakness may not matter as much to investors when 
they evaluate the severity of each part of the weakness in the Top Down structure 
because the parts fall under the overall umbrella of the weakness, which makes the parts 
appear to stem from a singular problem in ICFR. I expect the opposite effect in the 
Bottom Up structure where each of the parts is made more salient when not initially 
under the overall material weakness umbrella. Therefore, I expect an interaction effect 
whereby ICFR specific terminology makes each individual part of the weakness appear 
more severe to investors in the Bottom Up structure and that the impact of ICFR 
terminology on the perceived severity of the individual parts decreases in the Top Down 
condition. 
4.1.3.2 Path from Structure to Perceived Weakness Severity 
 In addition to moderating the impact of ICFR terminology on investors’ 
perceptions of the perceived severity of the individual parts of the weakness, I posit that 
using a Bottom Up (as opposed to Top Down) presentation structure will separately cause 
investors to perceive there to more distinct problems for management to face in ICFR, 
which in turn should cause investors to perceive the material weakness to be more severe. 
Research in psychology has generally found that individuals tend to infer the total 
quantity of an object by the number of subunits into which it is divided, particularly when 
individuals are motivated to be accurate and the task is difficult (Petty and Cacioppo 
1984; Pelham et al. 1994; Pelham and Neter 1995; Burson et al. 2009). As I explained 
previously, presenting the parts of the material weakness first in the Bottom Up structure 
should lead investors to partition the weakness into a greater number of subunits, which 
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increases the perceived number of distinct problems there are in ICFR (Fox et al. 2005; 
Shah and Oppenheimer 2011). On the other hand, when the material weakness is 
presented first in the Top Down structure, investors should not partition the weakness 
into subunits, which decreases the perceived number of distinct problems there are in 
ICFR.  Therefore, as the perceived number of distinct problems increases, the perceived 
severity of the weakness will also increase.13  
4.1.3.3 The Effect of Perceived Material Weakness Severity on Investment 
Desirability 
 I expect that investors will use the severity signals they perceive from the 
company’s ICFR reports in their judgments of the desirability of the company as an 
investment. Lambert et al. (2007) hypothesize that investors’ beliefs about a firm’s future 
cash flows depends in part on the quality of the accounting signal disclosed by 
management. Internal control issues that a firm discloses increases the noise of the firm’s 
accounting signal, and investors respond to the increased noise by requiring a higher cost 
of capital because of doubt that the expectations of future cash flows will be met. 
Therefore, I expect that the investment desirability of a firm decreases as the perceived 
severity of the material weakness increase.  
 In summary, based on my predictions from H3 and the causal paths I predicted 
above, I theorize a model where ICFR terminology negatively impacts investment 
desirability through its effects on investors’ perceptions of the severity of the individual 
parts of the weakness which then impacts their perceptions of the overall severity of the 
                                                          
13
 Both Studies 1 and 2 were designed simultaneously, and I only had knowledge of the initial findings of 
Study 1 by the time I collect data for Study 2 at the end of September 2017. I had not yet re-run the analysis 
for Study 1 with the alternative model until the first week of October 2017. Therefore, the predictions for 
Study 2 are based theory and the initial findings from Study 1 (see Figure 4).  
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weakness. I also expect presentation structure to moderate terminology’s impact on 
investment desirability insomuch that terminology’s negative impact on investment 
desirability will be reduced with the Top Down structure. Additionally, I expect 
presentation structure to have its own impact on investment desirability by increasing the 
perceived number of problems in ICFR which should also increase the perceived overall 
severity of the weakness. My predicted theoretical model is shown in Figure 7. My 
second hypothesis is formally stated as follows: 
H4a: ICFR terminology will negatively affect investment desirability by 
increasing the perceived severity of the individual parts of the weakness 
which will increase the perceived overall severity of the material weakness. 
Presentation structure will moderate this effect so that the impact of ICFR 
terminology is reduced in the Top Down structure. 
H4b: The Bottom Up structure will negatively impact investment desirability by 
increasing the perceived number of distinct problems in ICFR, which will 
increase the perceived overall severity of the material weakness. 
4.1.4 Research Question 
While not the focus of this study, I examine the impact of an instruction that 
provides investors with the definition of the ICFR term used in the report. Although not 
required to do so, many companies include the definitions of ICFR terminology in their 
ICFR reports. Specifically, I provide investors with a definition of a significant 
deficiency based on how the SEC defines it. The SEC defines a significant deficiency as 
being “less severe” than a material weakness (see footnote 3 for the full definition, SEC 
2007b). In this definition, the SEC gives a comparative statement concerning the 
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difference between a significant deficiency and material weakness. As I discussed 
previously, prior research finds that investors react similarly to the disclosure of the 
different deficiency types, and that research suggests that is probably because of a lack of 
understanding about the difference in deficiency types (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009).  
Therefore, I test whether providing the definition of the ICFR terminology used in the 
report impacts the perceived severity of the weakness. 
In one possibility, providing this definition reduces the perceived severity of the 
material weakness because with a better understanding of the differences between ICFR 
deficiencies (i.e., material weakness and significant deficiencies) investors perceive the 
term “significant deficiency” to convey different information than the overall “material 
weakness” term (i.e., the parts of the weakness are in fact less severe than the term used 
to identify the whole problem). On the other hand, providing this definition may not 
impact the perceived severity of the material weakness because investors still rely on the 
inherent negative affect of the ICFR terminology, which still sounds bad even with this 
definition provided. Because of these two possibilities, I propose a research question to 
investigate how providing this instruction will impact the perceived severity of the 
material weakness when the ICFR terminology is used in the report. 
R2: How does providing investors with the definition of an ICFR term impact the 
perceived severity of the material weakness when the ICFR term is used? 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Design and Participants 
 I conducted a 3x2 between-subjects experiment with ICFR terminology (“issues”, 
“significant deficiencies”, or “significant deficiency” with definition) and presentation 
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structure (Top Down, Bottom Up) as my manipulated variables. I used professional MBA 
students from a large public university in the U.S. as participants in my study.14 MBA 
students have been found to be suitable surrogates for non-professional investors (Elliott 
et al. 2007). Non-professional investors are an appropriate population with which to study 
the impact of material weakness grouping because there is evidence that management’s 
ICFR reports, in particular those that disclose ineffective ICFR, are more informative to 
small/non-professional investors’ judgments than those of professional investors (De 
Franco et al. 2005; Arnold et al. 2011).  
 The MBA students were offered course credit to participate in the study. I 
collected a total of 155 usable responses.15 The MBA participants were 31.6 percent 
female, had an average age of 35.9 years, had an average of 13.1 years of professional 
work experience, and had taken an average of 2.0 accounting classes (all untabulated).   
4.2.2 Task and Procedures 
Participants were sent a recruitment email inviting them to take part in the study 
with details of the class credit they would receive for completing the study. The students 
clicked on a link provided in the email and were brought to a Qualtrics© survey. 
Participants then indicated their consent to participate in the study. Participants were told 
that they were to assume the role of a general investor evaluating a public U.S. company 
named Griffin Inc., and they were told that they would be asked to make investing 
decisions and assess the severity of the internal control issues facing the company.  
                                                          
14
 The subjects for Study 2 came from the same MBA population as Study 1 but did not participate in Study 
1. 
 
15
 A total of 173 MBA students participated in the study. I removed 18 observations because these 
participants indicated that they had already participated in this same survey for credit in another class (i.e., 
these 18 individuals were enrolled in two (or more) of the classes that I solicited to participate in the study). 
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 In the first section of the task, participants read the background information about 
Griffin and its products. They read selected financial information for the past three years. 
Next, participants read analyst forecast about the company, followed by stock price data 
over the past year, both of which suggested volatility in the company’s performance and 
uncertainty concerning the future prospects of the company.  
 The next part of the task provided participants with some ICFR instruction. First, 
all participants read a definition of a material weakness regardless of condition.16 Then, 
depending on the condition, participants either read no other instruction or an extra 
instruction (see below for details of the instruction). After reading these instructions, 
participants were asked a comprehension check question that quizzed them on the 
instruction they just received (no comprehension check question was given in the no 
extra instruction conditions), and participants could not continue the task until they 
answered the question correctly. Forcing participants to answer the question correctly 
helped to ensure that they understood the instruction before moving on. 
 Participants were then shown management’s report on ICFR. All participants read 
about management’s responsibility for establishing and maintaining ICFR and that 
management determined that ICFR was not effective as of the end of the fiscal year. At 
this point I introduced both the ICFR terminology and the presentation structure 
manipulations, and participants read about the material weakness with the Top Down or 
Bottom Up structure, and the parts of the material weakness were presented as “issues” or 
“significant deficiencies”. There were four parts to the material weakness presented in 
bullet-point format. Finally, all participants read that management is committed to 
                                                          
16
 Providing the definition of a material weakness is a very common practice in public company ICFR 
reports. 
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remediating internal controls and that the independent auditor conducted its own 
evaluation and identified the same weakness (the auditor’s report is not included in the 
case). For the second and third sections of the task, participants responded to questions 
regarding the primary dependent variables and demographic variables. 
4.2.3 Independent Variables 
 My first independent variable is ICFR terminology. I note here that I keep the 
wording of the individual parts of the weakness constant in all three levels of the variable. 
I have included all three levels of the ICFR terminology variable in Appendix C. In the 
non-ICFR terminology condition, the individual parts of the material weakness are 
identified as “issues” that make up the material weakness. In the ICFR terminology 
condition (without instruction) the individual parts of the weakness are identified as 
“significant deficiencies”. In the final level of this variable, the parts of the weakness are 
identified as “significant deficiencies”, and before reading the ICFR report, participants 
also read a definition of a significant deficiency, which is based on the definition 
provided by the SEC.   
My second independent variable is material weakness presentation structure. For 
the Top Down structure, the material weakness is identified first, followed by 
descriptions of its individual parts. For the Bottom Up structure, the parts of the weakness 
are described first, which are then summarized into one material weakness.  
4.2.4 Dependent Variables 
Almost all of the dependent variables I used in Study 2, save Individual Severity, 
are identical to those in Study 1, but I repeat their explanations here as a reminder. The 
variable of interest for H1 involves investor perceptions of the severity of the material 
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weakness. To operationalize this construct, I asked participants to indicate their 
perception of the overall severity of the weakness on a scale from 0 (“Not severe at all”) 
to 10 (“Extremely severe”). Additionally, I also asked participants their perceived 
likelihood of material misstatement in Griffin’s financial statements on a scale from 0 
(“Low likelihood”) to 10 (“High likelihood”). These two questions that asked about 
participants’ perceptions of material weakness severity had a high degree of reliability 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.81), and the two questions loaded onto a single factor, which 
explains 85.5 percent of the variation. Therefore, I constructed a new variable Severity 
that is a factor score of these two questions. 
The main variables of interest for H2 include investor perceptions of the number 
of distinct problems that management faces in their ICFR, the perceived severity of each 
of the individual parts of the material weakness, and the investment desirability of the 
company. To operationalize the first construct (number of distinct problems), I asked 
participants the extent to which they agreed with two statements on a scale from 0 
(“Definitely disagree”) to 10 (“Definitely agree”): “Griffin mainly faces one issue within 
their internal controls” and “Griffin mainly faces multiple, distinct issues within their 
internal controls.” The formulation of the question and the range itself helped to avoid 
demand effects (e.g., participants respond based on what they think the experimenter 
wants) so that participants responded with their own interpretation of the facts of the 
case.  I ran a factor analysis for these two questions. They had a high degree of reliability 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.83), and the two questions loaded onto a single factor (hereafter 
referred to as “Problems”), which explains 85.8 percent of the variation. 
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For the second construct, I presented the description of the material weakness 
section of the ICFR report again to participants exactly as they saw it the ICFR report and 
asked them to rate the severity of each of the four parts of the material weakness 
individual on a scale from 0 (“Not severe”) to 10 (“Very severe”). The four severity 
questions had a high degree of reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.74). I average the 
responses to these four questions to get a measure of the severity of each individual part 
of the weakness (hereafter referred to as “Individual Severity”).  
Finally, to measure the investment desirability of the company, I asked three 
questions that have been used in previous studies of investor behavior. First, I asked 
participants about their willingness to invest in the company’s stock on a scale from 0 
(“Absolutely not willing to invest”) to 10 (“Absolutely willing to invest”) (Elliott et al. 
2015). Participants were then asked to assume that they already held the company’s stock 
and decide how they might change their investment on a scale from -5 (“Significantly 
decrease”) to 5 (“Significantly increase”) (Tan and Yu 2018). Finally, I asked participants 
their opinion as to how the company’s stock price will change as a result of the control 
weakness disclosure on a scale from -5 (“Significant decrease”) to 5 (Significant 
increase) (Rose et al. 2010).  The three questions concerning investment desirability had 
a high degree of reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.76) and loaded onto a single factor 
(hereafter referred to as “Desirability”), which explains 68.4 percent of the variation. 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Manipulation Check 
 I asked participants to indicate what the individual control problems in Griffin’s 
internal control report were labeled as, issues or significant deficiencies. One hundred 
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and one (65.2%) participants correctly answered this manipulation check question. A χ2 
test for a 3x2 frequency table showed that there was not a significant relationship 
between incorrectly answering the manipulation check question and my manipulated 
variables (χ2=2.16, p-value=0.34)17. Because my theory relies on the fact that investors 
notice and react differently to the presence of the ICFR/non-ICFR terminology, I 
removed those participants that did not correctly answer this manipulation check 
question. This left me with 101 usable responses.18 I did not have a manipulation check 
for the manipulation of the Top Down/Bottom Up structures because my theory suggests 
that the structure’s effect on the perceived number of issues in ICFR should be automatic 
and unconscious (Fox and Clemen 2005); therefore, my examination did not require 
participants to remember exactly the structure that was presented to them.    
4.3.2 Hypothesis Tests 
4.3.2.1 Test of H3 
 H3 predicts that identifying the parts of the material weakness with ICFR 
terminology (rather than with a non-ICFR term) will increase investors’ perceptions of 
the severity of the weakness with a Bottom Up structure and that this effect will be 
moderated when the material weakness is presented with a Top Down structure. 
Descriptive statistics for Severity (for all six experimental conditions) are found in Panel 
A of Table 2. Results for the hypothesis tests are presented in Panel B of Table 2. 
                                                          
17
 All p-values are two-tailed unless otherwise specified.  
 
18
 Using all participants does impact my results. With all participants, the main effect of using ICFR 
terminology on perceived severity is marginally significant (p<0.10), and the main effect of ICFR 
terminology on the perceived number of problems is no longer significant (p>0.10). Further, the negative 
indirect effect of ICFR terminology on investment desirability through the perceived number of problems 
and perceived severity of the weakness is no longer significant (zero is included in the 95 percent bootstrap 
confidence interval). These results are logical because I would not expect participants to react more 
negatively or perceive there to be more issues in ICFR in the presence of the term “significant deficiency” 
over “issues” if they did not notice the word in the first place.  
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To test H3, I conduct a 2x2 ANOVA just using the four cells without instruction. 
Inconsistent with H1, I do not find evidence of an interaction between ICFR terminology 
and presentation structure (F1,52=0.001; p-value=0.487, one-tailed). Instead, I find a 
significant main effect of identifying the individual parts of the weakness as significant 
deficiencies vs. issues (means: 0.061 vs. -0.530, F1,52=6.569, p-value=0.013; see Figure 
8). The results suggest that presentation structure does not moderate the effect of ICFR 
terminology on the perceived overall severity of the material weakness; rather, 
identifying the parts of the material weakness with ICFR terminology increases the 
perceived overall severity of the material weakness regardless of the presentation 
structure. 
4.3.2.2 Test of H4 
 In H4a, I predict that ICFR terminology would negatively impact investment 
desirability through its effect on the perceived severity of the individual parts of the 
weakness and the perceived severity of the overall weakness but that this effect would be 
moderated by presentation structure. In H4b, I also predict that presentation structure 
itself (specifically the Bottom Up structure as compared to the Top Down structure) 
would negatively impact investment desirability through its effects on the perceived 
number of problems in ICFR and perceived overall severity of the weakness. I use a 
structural equations model to test the significance of the indirect effects I predict in H4. 
The coefficients for the direct effects for each link in the model are shown in Panel A of 
Figure 9. 
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The fit of the model appears to be good, with χ2/df of 1.42 (p>0.10) and CFI of 
0.94 (Iacobucci 2010).19 The results show that the main effect of using ICFR Terminology 
is positively associated with Individual Severity (estimate=1.00, p-value=0.006), 
indicating that identifying the parts of the weakness as significant deficiencies makes 
each part appear to be more severe.20 I do not find evidence that presentation structure 
moderates the impact of ICFR Terminology on Individual Severity (estimate=-0.112, p-
value=0.57, one tailed). Individual Severity is positively associated with (overall) 
Severity. I do not find evidence that the Bottom Up presentation structure (as opposed to 
the Top Down structure) is associated with Problems (estimate=-0.054, p-value=0.59, 
one tailed). I discuss this result more in depth in section 4.3.3.1. Additionally, Problems 
is positively associated with (overall) Severity (estimate=0.277, p-value=0.01, one tailed). 
Finally, Severity is positively associated with Desirability, which suggests that as 
participants’ perceptions of the severity of the material weakness becomes more severe, 
they perceive the company to be less desirable as an investment. 
I calculate indirect effects and 95 percent bootstrapped confidence intervals for 
the three indirect effects predicted in H4 using SPSS AMOS. Results for the indirect 
effects are shown in Panel B of Figure 9. First, I find that the indirect effect of ICFR 
Terminology on Desirability through Individual Severity and (overall) Severity 
(represented as path a x c x f in Figure 9) is negative and statistically significant 
                                                          
19
 RMSEA for the model is 0.087, which is larger than the common cutoff for good model fit of less than 
0.05. However, Kenny et al. (2015) suggests that RMSEA is not a reliable indicator of model fit for models 
with small sample sizes and small degrees of freedom, both of which seem to be met in my study. 
 
20
 I code ICFR Terminology (Bottom Up vs. Top Down) to be -0.5 and 0.5 for the “issues” and “significant 
deficiencies” (Top Down and Bottom Up) conditions, respectively. This is known as main effects 
parameterization and makes it so that the coefficients on ICFR Terminology and Bottom Up vs. Top Down 
represent the main effects of those variables rather than just the simple effect, which is the interpretation 
under the standard [0, 1] coding scheme (Hayes 2013). 
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(estimate=-0.102, 95 percent of bootstrapped estimates were less than -0.024). To test 
whether this significant indirect effect is moderated by presentation structure, I teste 
whether the interaction term of ICFR Terminology and Bottom Up vs. Top Down in my 
model had a significant indirect effect on Desirability through Individual Severity and 
(overall) Severity (represented as path b x c x f in Figure 9). As I described in Study 1, 
Hayes (2015) suggests that the indirect effect of an interaction term in a model represents 
an index of moderated mediation. If the indirect effect of the interaction term is 
significant, it provides evidence of moderated mediation in a model. I do not find 
evidence of a statistically significant indirect effect of the interaction term and 
Desirability (estimate=0.012, 95 percent of bootstrapped estimates were greater than -
0.081, which includes zero in the interval). These two results suggest that using ICFR 
specific terminology does negatively impact how participants perceived the company as 
an investment but that presentation structure does not moderate this relationship. 
Therefore, these results are somewhat inconsistent with H4a.  
Finally, I do not find evidence of a statistically significant indirect effect of using 
the Bottom Up structure (compared to the Top Down structure) on Desirability through 
Problems and Severity (represented as path d x e x f in Figure 9) (estimate=0.008, 95 
percent of bootstrapped estimates were less than 0.183, which includes zero in the 
interval). This result is inconsistent with H4b.  
4.3.3 Supplemental Analyses 
4.3.3.1 Effect of Structure and Terminology on Number of Problems 
In Study 1, I predict and find that the Bottom Up presentation structure is 
associated with a greater number of perceived problems in ICFR than the Top Down 
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structure (see Panel C Table 1). In this study I examine this same relationship in the 
experimental conditions that exactly mirror those in the Study 1, which are the Top 
Down/Bottom Up conditions that use non-ICFR specific terminology (i.e., “issues”). I 
examine the relationship between presentation structure and the perceived number of 
problems using a 2 × 2 ANOVA in which I include ICFR terminology as the second 
factor. I do not find a statistically significant difference between participants’ perceptions 
of the number of problems in ICFR in the Bottom Up and Top Down condition 
(estimate= -0.098, p-value=0.63, one tailed, untabulated). There are no standout reasons 
that may explain the contradictory results between Study 1 and Study 2. I compare 
demographic data, using a series of one-way ANOVAs, between the participants in the 
two Top Down/Bottom Up cells of Study 1 and the same two cells in Study 2 (where the 
parts of the weakness are identified as “issues”). There are no statistically significant 
differences between Study 1 and Study 2 participants in terms of the time they took to 
complete the study, their age, the number of accounting classes they have taken, or their 
pre-survey understanding of the terms “material weakness” and “significant deficiency” 
(p-values all greater than 0.10, untabulated). However, I do find that the number of years 
of work experience of participants in Study 2 is significantly greater than that of 
participants in Study 1 (14.7 vs. 10.5 years, F1,66=4.01, p=0.049, untabulated). It could be 
possible that because participants with more professional work experience are “wiser”, in 
the sense that over the course of many years of experience they have learned how to 
access and analyze information necessary for their decision making, they may not be as 
beholden to partition dependence as those without that experience. In other words, people 
with more work experience may be less likely to automatically accept a partition 
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structure given to them. Future research can examine this potential relationship between 
professional work experience and partition dependence.   
One interesting and unexpected finding that I find in the analysis of presentation 
structure’s effect on participants’ perceived number of problems in ICFR is that using 
ICFR terminology does impact participants’ perceptions of the number of distinct 
problems in ICFR. Specifically, I find that the main effect of labeling the parts of the 
material weakness as significant deficiencies rather than issues significantly increases the 
perceived number of problems in ICFR (means: 0.130 vs. -0.325; F1, 52=4.695; p=0.035, 
untabulated)21. This result suggests that using ICFR terminology impacts not only the 
perceived severity of each individual parts of the material weakness, but also how 
participants partition the material weakness. Two theories can potentially explain this 
unexpected finding. The first theory emphasizes the uniqueness of the term “significant 
deficiency” in the context of ICFR reporting. Prior research has found that words that are 
semantically unique in specific contexts are more “distinct” to the reader (Schmidt 1985; 
Schmidt 1991). Therefore, investors may perceive the “significant deficiencies” of the 
material weakness to be more “distinct” items that need to be evaluated individually 
rather than to be considered together as a group (Shah and Oppenheimer 2011), which 
would lead investors to perceive there to be more distinct problems in ICFR. 
The second theory emphasizes the negative connotation associated with the word 
“deficiencies” as opposed to “issues” (Warriner et al. 2013). Prior research has shown 
that words with negative connotations are also more “distinct” to readers than neutral 
words, and readers give more attention and processing to these words (Gaillard et al. 
2006; Schmidt and Saari 2007; Kousta et al. 2009). Therefore, negative affect is likely to 
                                                          
21
 The interaction term of this ANOVA was not statistically significant (F1,52=0.018, p-value=0.893). 
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be induced by the term “significant deficiencies,” leading investors to view the individual 
parts of the weakness more distinctly rather than the view the parts as belonging to the 
weakness as a whole. Both theories lead to the same conclusion about the impact of ICFR 
terminology on the perceived number of distinct problems in ICFR. I do not intend to 
differentiate between the two theories in this dissertation. I leave it to future research to 
better understand this unexpected finding.  
4.3.3.2 Alternative Model and Analysis 
Based on the unexpected finding described in the previous section, I consider an 
alternative model where ICFR specific terminology influences investment desirability 
through two paths: ICFR terminology increases the perceived severity of the individual 
parts of the weakness, which then increases the perceived overall severity of the 
weakness (similar to what I posited in the model shown in Figure 7); and ICFR 
terminology increases the perceived number of problems in ICFR, which also increases 
the perceived overall severity  of the material weakness. Figure 10 depicts my alternative 
model where the first box of the model is the main effect of ICFR terminology. I once 
again use a structural equations model (via SPSS AMOS) to test the significance of the 
indirect effects that I just enumerated above. The coefficients for the direct effects for 
each link in the model are shown in Figure 10.  
The fit of the model was good, with a χ2/df of 1.86 (p>0.10) and CFI of 0.981 
(Iacobucci 2010).22 The results show that ICFR terminology is positively associated with 
Problems (estimate=0.455, p=0.023), indicating that the use of ICFR terminology 
                                                          
22
 RMSEA for this model is 0.125, which is above the traditional cutoff for good model fit of 0.05. Once 
again, (Kenny et al. 2015)suggests that RMSEA is not a reliable indicator of model fit for models with 
small sample sizes and small degrees of freedom.  
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increases the perceived number of distinct problems in ICFR.  Problems is positively 
associated with Severity (estimate=0.273, p=0.009, one tailed), which suggests that as the 
perceived number of problems increases, the perceived overall severity of the material 
weakness increases. ICFR terminology is also positively associated with Individual 
Severity (estimate=0.991, p=0.008), indicating that the impact of ICFR terminology also 
occurs on the individual deficiency level. Individual Severity is positively associated with 
Severity (estimate=0.195, p=0.032, one tailed). Finally, Severity is negatively associated 
with Desirability (estimate=-0.516, p=.002, one tailed).  
 Next, I test whether the two indirect effects of using ICFR terminology on 
Desirability through Problems and Individual Severity, respectively, are significant. 
Results for the indirect effects are shown in Panel B of Figure 10. First, I find that the 
indirect effect of using ICFR terminology on Desirability through Problems is 
significantly negative (estimate=-0.064, 95 percent bootstrapped confidence interval was 
between -0.223 and -0.00823). Second, I find that the indirect effect of using ICFR 
terminology on Desirability through Individual Severity is also significantly negative 
(estimate=-0.100, 95 percent bootstrap confidence interval was between -0.289 and -
0.012).
 
 Finally, the total effect of ICFR terminology on investment desirability is 
significantly negative (p=0.039), although the direct effect of ICFR terminology on 
investment desirability (controlling for indirect effects) is not significant (p=0.379).  
In summary, using an alternative model I find evidence that using ICFR 
terminology to identify the parts of a material weakness negatively impacts the 
investment desirability of the company through two separate effects on perceived severity 
                                                          
23
 If  zero is not within 95 percent of the 10,000 indirect effect estimates, the indirect effect is determined to 
be significantly different from zero (Preacher and Hayes 2008; Hayes 2013). 
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of the weakness.24 Not only do I find that identifying the parts of the weakness as 
significant deficiencies makes each part “sound worse”, I also find that the significant 
deficiency label fundamentally changes how participants partition the material weakness 
insomuch that calling the parts “significant deficiencies” makes each part of the material 
weakness appear to be a more distinct problem than when they are just referred to as 
“issues”. While these results do not fully support my initial prediction for H4, I believe 
the results do fit the theory I use to develop H2 albeit from an alternative perspective.  
4.3.3.3 Impact of the Definition Instruction 
 In R1, I question whether providing the ICFR definition to investors would affect 
their perceptions of the severity of the material weakness compared to when no such 
definition is provided. To investigate R1, I compare Severity between the “significant 
deficiencies” and the “significant deficiencies + definition” conditions at each level of 
presentation structure. Descriptive statistics for these four cells are presented in Panel A 
of Table 1. The ANOVA results show no significant main effect of including the 
definition (means: 0.144 vs. 0.061, F=0.277 p=0.600, untabulated).25 These results 
suggest that providing a definition for the ICFR terminology does not alleviate investors’ 
concerns of the negative affect of the ICFR specific term.  
I further test whether providing the definition of significant deficiency improves 
investors’ understanding of the difference between material weaknesses and significant 
deficiencies. I asked the following question: “Based on your understanding of the two 
terms, what is the relative severity of significant deficiencies and material weaknesses to 
                                                          
24
 I do not find evidence that the alternative model fits the data better than the original model (difference in 
χ2 = 5.241, df = 4, p-value = 0.263). 
 
25
 The interaction is not significant (p=0.583). 
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each other?” on a scale ranging from -5 (“Significant deficiency definitely more severe”) 
to 5 (“Material weakness definitely more severe”), with 0 as the mid-point (“Similarly 
severe”). Results show that the mean response is significantly greater when participants 
are given the instruction than when no instruction is given (means=3.18 vs. 0.589, 
F=15.11, p<0.001). These results suggest that the instruction helps to improve investors’ 
understanding of the difference in severity between material weakness and significant 
deficiencies, but is not sufficient to affect investors’ perceptions of the severity of the 
material weakness itself.   
4.4 Discussion 
  In this second study, I expand on the ideas of Study 1 by examining how the 
terminology used to identify the parts of a material weakness could impact investor 
perceptions of the severity of the material weakness and how material weakness 
presentation structure may moderate that relationship. Additionally, I simultaneously 
examine how ICFR terminology and presentation structure impact investor perceptions of 
the investment desirability through their effects on the perceived severity of the 
individual parts and the perceived number of distinct issues in ICFR, respectively. 
Finally, I examine how providing investors with a definition of the ICFR terminology 
impact the perceived severity of the material weakness. 
  I find that using ICFR terminology to identify the parts of the material weakness, 
as opposed to using non-ICFR terminology, significantly increases the perceived severity 
of the material weakness. Contrary to my predictions, I do not find that material 
weakness presentation structure (whether the material weakness was first identified after 
which the parts of the weakness were described or vice versa) moderates the effect of 
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ICFR terminology on perceived severity of the weakness. Contrary to the results of Study 
1, I do not find that presentation structure impacted the perceived number of distinct 
problems in ICFR or has a significant indirect effect on investment desirability.  
However, I do find, unexpectedly, that using ICFR terminology to identify the 
parts of the weakness significantly increases participants’ perceived number of distinct 
problems in ICFR. Based on this unexpected finding, I construct an alternative model and 
find that using ICFR terminology has two significantly negative indirect effects on 
investment desirability: (1) ICFR terminology increases the perceived number of distinct 
problems in ICFR, which increases the perceived severity of the weakness, and (2) ICFR 
terminology increases the perceived severity of the individual parts of the weakness, 
which also increases the perceived severity of the weakness. As perceptions of material 
weakness severity increases, the investment desirability of the company decreases.  
Finally, I do not find that including an instruction that defines significant 
deficiencies (vs. not including the definition) significantly impacts the perceived severity 
of the weakness even though the instruction does increase participants’ understanding of 
the relative difference between different types of ICFR terminology (i.e., material 
weaknesses and significant deficiencies).  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
Management’s ICFR report offers investors valuable information with which to 
make informed financial decisions. However, SEC regulations allow management a lot of 
discretion concerning how to disclose internal control problems to investors. In this 
dissertation I specifically examine the scenario where the material weakness that 
management discloses is made up of multiple smaller problems and management 
discloses those multiple problems in their ICFR report. Over the course of two studies, I 
examine how material weakness presentation structure and ICFR terminology impact 
investor perceptions of material weakness severity and the desirability of the company as 
an investment.   
I find mixed results in Study 1. I find that first presenting the parts of the material 
weakness (Bottom Up structure), as opposed to disclosing the overall material weakness 
first (Top Down structure), increases the number of distinct problems participants 
perceive there to be in ICFR and that providing participants with an instruction that 
deemphasizes the importance of partitioning the weakness decreases the impact of this 
relationship. In addition, I initially find that this presentation structure negatively impacts 
the investment desirability of the company because the Bottom Up structure (as opposed 
to the Top Down structure) increases the perceived number of problems in ICFR, which 
increases the perceived overall severity of the material weakness, which decreases 
investment desirability. However, with an alternative model that allows the relationship 
between the perceived number of problems in ICFR and perceived material weakness 
severity to vary based on whether participants are given the instruction, I ultimately do 
not find a significant relationship between presentation structure and investment 
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desirability. These mixed results limit the conclusions I can draw from this study and 
how they contribute to theory and practice.  
In Study 2, I find that using ICFR specific terminology to identify the parts of a 
material weakness negatively impacts the desirability of the company as an investment in 
two ways: (1) ICFR terminology increases the perceived severity of each individual part 
of the weakness, which increases overall perceptions of material weakness severity and 
(2) ICFR terminology increases the perceived number of distinct problems in ICFR, 
which also increases overall perceptions of material weakness severity. My results 
suggest that using ICFR terminology to identify the parts of the material weakness 
increase the perceived severity of the weakness not only because the ICFR terminology 
“sounds worse” than the non-ICFR terminology but also because using ICFR 
terminology fundamentally changes how investors partition the material weakness 
insomuch that they perceive there to be more distinct problems in ICFR when ICFR 
specific terminology is used.  
The results of this second study contribute in a number of ways to both theory and 
practice. They contribute to the psychology literature on partition dependence because I 
show that the terms used to identify the parts of a multiple-part issue can impact how 
people partition the issue. My results suggest that terms that are semantically unique in a 
context and/or have more inherently negative affect associated with them (e.g., 
“significant deficiencies”) can cause people to feel more strongly that those parts are 
more distinct problems rather than belonging to a single problem.  
The results of this second study also contribute directly to practice. Management 
can pull many levers when it comes to disclosing a material weakness in ICFR. In context 
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of the experiment that I conducted in my second study, management could identify four 
significant deficiencies in ICFR that it determines to be a material weakness, and 
management could disclose that material weakness as being made up of four “issues” or 
four “significant deficiencies”. According to my results, management should avoid using 
specific ICFR terminology when disclosing a material weakness made up of smaller 
control deficiencies, which could help management avoid a negative impact on the 
investment desirability of their company. Management should also find it useful to know 
that providing investors with instruction that defines ICFR terminology may not help 
them reduce the negative impact of disclosing the parts of the material weakness with 
ICFR terminology. Regulators, on the other hand, should find my study informative for 
the reasons I just explained for why management would find these findings interesting: 
they should be aware that management can get away with making their ICFR appear 
better just by using different terms to describe their material weakness. They should be 
aware that investors find this terminology information useful in their decision making. 
Finally, one major discrepant finding between Study 1 and Study 2 is that I do not 
replicate my finding in Study 1 that using a Bottom Up presentation structure increases 
participants’ perceptions of the number of distinct problems in ICFR in Study 2. Because 
I do not replicate this finding, I cannot conclude that presentation structure impacts the 
way participants partition the material weakness. While I do not have a definitive 
explanation for why this result does not replicate in my second study, an analysis shows 
that the participants in Study 2 have a significantly greater amount of professional work 
experience than the corresponding participants in Study 1. It is possible that some aspect 
of work experience makes it so that people do not automatically accept the partition 
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structure that is given to them (Fox and Clemen 2005). Future research can examine if 
there is a relationship between professional work experience and people’s adoption of 
subjective partitions. 
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Figure 1 
Study 1: Predicted Results H1: Perceived Number of Problems 
 
 
This figure displays the shape of the marginal means of participants’ ratings of the number of perceived 
problems in ICFR as predicted in H1. 
 
Structure: Bottom Up presents the individual parts of the weakness first before disclosing the overall 
material weakness while Top Down does the opposite. 
 
Instruction: Participants receive either no extra instruction or they receive an instruction that informs that 
that it is not the number of problems that make a weakness material, but whether an issue, or combination 
of issues, creates a reasonable possibility of material misstatement in the financial statements. 
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Figure 2 
Study 1: Theoretical Structural Model for H2 
 
 
 
Notes: 
 Bottom Up vs. Top Down is a manipulated variable where the material weakness is either 
identified first followed by a description of the parts (Top Down) or the parts are 
described first and then the material weakness is identified (Bottom Up). 
 
 Instruction is a manipulated variable where participants are either given or not given an 
extra instruction on ICFR. 
 
 Problems is a composite factor variable made up of two questions that get at participants’ 
perceptions about the number of issues that make up the material weakness. 
 
 Severity is a composite factor variable made up of two questions that get at participants’ 
perceptions of overall severity of the weakness and the likelihood of material misstates in 
the financial statements 
 
 Desirability is a composite factor variable made up of three questions that get at 
participants’ willingness to invest in the company, intentions to change their holdings in 
the company given they owned stock, and predictions of future stock price movements. 
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Figure 3 
Study 1: Observed Results for H1: Perceived Number of Problems 
 
 
This figure displays the observed shape of the marginal means of participants’ ratings of the number of 
perceived problems in ICFR. 
 
Structure: Bottom Up presents the individual parts of the weakness first before disclosing the overall 
material weakness while Top Down does the opposite. 
 
Instruction: Participants receive either no extra instruction or they receive an instruction that informs that 
that it is not the number of problems that make a weakness material, but whether an issue, or combination 
of issues, creates a reasonable possibility of material misstatement in the financial statements. 
 
Problems: A factor score made up of two questions that ask participants how strongly they believe that 
there are multiple, distinct problems in ICFR. 
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Figure 4 
Study 1: Structural Equations Model for H2 
Panel A: Direct Path Coefficients 
 
 
Panel B: Tests of Indirect Paths 
Indirect Path Significance Test 
Predicted 
sign 
Path 
estimate 
95% one-tailed 
bootstrapped 
confidence interval Test result 
Path from Bottom Up vs. Top 
Down (simple effect) to 
Desirability through Problems 
and Severity (i.e., a x c x d) 
 
- -0.082 
95% of bootstrapped 
estimates < -0.021  
Significant
 
 
Path from the interaction of 
Instruction and Bottom Up vs. 
Top Down to Desirability 
through Problems and 
Severity (i.e., b x c x d) 
+ 0.129 
95% of bootstrapped 
estimates > 0.044  
Significant
 
 
Notes: 
 Bottom Up vs. Top Down is a manipulated variable where the material weakness is either 
identified first followed by a description of the parts (Top Down) or the parts are described 
first and then the material weakness is identified (Bottom Up). 
 
 Instruction is a manipulated variable where participants are either given or not given an 
extra instruction on ICFR. 
 
 Problems is a composite factor variable made up of two questions that get at participants’ 
perceptions about the number of problems that make up the material weakness. 
 
 Severity is a composite factor variable made up of two questions that get at participants’ 
perceptions of overall severity of the weakness and the likelihood of material misstates in 
the financial statements 
 
 Desirability is a composite factor variable made up of three questions that get at 
participants’ willingness to invest in the company, intentions to change their holdings in the 
company given they owned stock, and predictions of future stock price movements. 
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 All of the p-values displayed in the model are one tailed. 
 
 The simple effect of Instruction on Problems (only Top Down conditions) in the model is 
0.589 with p=0.004. 
 
 The indirect paths are tested using 10,000 bootstrapped samples to create bias-corrected 
confidence intervals (Preacher and Hayes 2008; Hayes 2013). 
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Figure 5 
Study 1: Alternative Structural Equations Model for H2 
 
Panel A: Direct Path Coefficients in No Instruction Condition 
 
Panel B: Direct Path Coefficients in Instruction Condition 
 
Panel C: Tests of Indirect Paths 
Indirect Path Significance Test 
Path 
estimate 
95% bootstrapped 
confidence interval Test result 
From Panel A: Path from Bottom Up vs. 
Top Down to Desirability through 
Problems and Severity (i.e., a x c x d) 
 
-0.036 -0.162 to 0.014  
Not 
Significant
 
 
From Panel B: Path from Bottom Up vs. 
Top Down to Desirability through 
Problems and Severity (i.e., a x c x d) 
0.076 -0.017 to 0.245  
Not 
Significant
 
 
Notes: 
 Bottom Up vs. Top Down is a manipulated variable where the material weakness is either 
identified first followed by a description of the parts (Top Down) or the parts are 
described first and then the material weakness is identified (Bottom Up). 
 
 Problems is a composite factor variable made up of two questions that get at participants’ 
perceptions about the number of issues that make up the material weakness. 
 
 Severity is a composite factor variable made up of two questions that get at participants’ 
perceptions of overall severity of the weakness and the likelihood of material misstates in 
the financial statements. 
 
 Desirability is a composite factor variable made up of three questions that get at 
participants’ willingness to invest in the company, intentions to change their holdings in 
the company given they owned stock, and predictions of future stock price movements. 
 
 All p-values are one tailed unless otherwise noted. 
 
 Path “d” was constrained to be the same in both Instruction conditions, which is why it 
has the same coefficient and p-value in both Panel A and B. 
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 The indirect paths are tested using 10,000 bootstrapped samples to create bias-corrected 
confidence intervals. 
 
 The models in Panel A and B are tested using the multi-group feature in SPSS AMOS. 
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Figure 6 
Study 2: Predicted Results H3: Perceived Overall Severity 
 
 
This figure displays the shape of the marginal means of participants’ ratings of the perceived severity of the 
material weakness as predicted in H3. 
 
Structure: Bottom Up presents the individual parts of the weakness first before disclosing the overall 
material weakness while Top Down does the opposite. 
 
ICFR Terminology: Issues labels the individual parts of the weakness as “issues” while Significant 
Deficiencies labels the individual parts of the weakness as “significant deficiencies”.   
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Figure 7 
Study 2: Theoretical Model of H4 
 
 
Notes: 
 ICFR Terminology: the parts of the material weakness are labeled as “significant 
deficiencies” or “issues”.  
 
 Bottom Up vs. Top Down:  the parts of the weakness are described first and then the 
material weakness is identified (Bottom Up), or the material weakness is identified first 
followed by a description of the parts of the weakness (Top Down).  
 
 Individual Severity is the average of four questions that get at participants’ perceptions of 
severity for each of the four parts of the material weakness. 
 
 Problems is a composite factor variable made up of two questions that get at participants’ 
perceptions about the number of distinct problems that make up the material weakness. 
 
 Severity is a composite factor variable made up of two questions that get at participants’ 
perception of the overall severity of the material weakness as well as their perception of 
the likelihood of a material misstatement in the financial statements. 
 
 Desirability is a composite factor variable made up of three questions that get at 
participants’ willingness to invest in the company, intentions to change their holdings in 
the company given they owned stock, and predictions of future stock price movements. 
  
73 
 
Figure 8 
Study 2: Observed Results for H3: Perceived Overall Severity 
 
 
 
This figure displays the shape of the observed marginal means from the ANOVA analysis of participants’ 
ratings of the perceived severity of the material weakness. 
 
Structure: Bottom Up structure presents the individual parts of the weakness first before disclosing the 
overall material weakness while Top Down does the opposite. 
 
ICFR Terminology: Issues identifies the individual parts of the weakness as “issues” while Significant 
Deficiencies identifies the individual parts of the weakness as “significant deficiencies”.   
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Figure 9 
Study 2: Structural Equations Model for H4 
 
Panel A: Direct Path Coefficients 
 
 
Panel B: Tests of Indirect Effects 
Indirect Effect 
Significance Test 
Predicted 
sign 
Indirect 
Effect 
95% bootstrapped 
confidence interval Test result 
ICFR Terminology on 
Desirability (i.e., a x c 
x f) 
 
- -0.102 95% of estimates < -0.024  Significant
 
 
Bottom Up vs. Top Down x 
ICFR on Desirability 
(i.e., b x c x f) 
 
- 0.012 95% of estimates <0.183  
Not 
Significant
 
 
Bottom Up vs. Top Down 
on Desirability (i.e., d 
x e x f) 
- 0.008 95% of estimates <0.077 
Not 
Significant 
Notes: 
 ICFR Terminology: the parts of the material weakness are labeled as “significant 
deficiencies” or “issues”.  
 
 Bottom Up vs. Top Down:  the parts of the weakness are described first and then the 
material weakness is identified (Bottom Up), or the material weakness is identified first 
followed by a description of the parts of the weakness (Top Down).  
 
 Individual Severity is the average of four questions that get at participants’ perceptions of 
severity for each of the four parts of the material weakness. 
 
 Problems is a composite factor variable made up of two questions that get at participants’ 
perceptions about the number of distinct problems that make up the material weakness. 
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 Severity is a composite factor variable made up of two questions that get at participants’ 
perception of the overall severity of the material weakness as well as their perception of 
the likelihood of a material misstatement in the financial statements. 
 
 Desirability is a composite factor variable made up of three questions that get at 
participants’ willingness to invest in the company, intentions to change their holdings in 
the company given they owned stock, and predictions of future stock price movements. 
 
 All p-values reported are one tailed. 
 
 The coefficients for paths “a” and “d” in Panel A represent the main effects of ICFR 
Terminology on Individual Severity and Bottom Up vs. Top Down on Problems, 
respectively. 
 
 The indirect paths are tested using 10,000 bootstrapped samples to create bias-corrected 
confidence intervals. 
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Figure 10 
Study 2: Alternative Structural Equations Model for H4 
 
Panel A: Direct Path Coefficients 
 
 
Panel B: Tests of Indirect Effects 
Indirect Effect Significance Test 
Indirect 
Effect 
95% bootstrapped 
confidence interval Test result 
Path 1 -0.064 -0.223 to -0.008  Significant
 
 
Path 2 -0.100 -0.289 to -0.012  Significant
 
 
 ICFR Terminology is a manipulated variable where the parts of the material weakness 
were labeled either as “significant deficiencies” or “issues”.  
 
 Individual Severity is the average of four questions that get at participants’ perceptions of 
severity for each of the four parts of the material weakness. 
 
 Problems is a composite factor variable made up of two questions that get at participants’ 
perceptions about the number of issues that make up the material weakness. 
 
 Severity is a composite factor variable made up of two questions that get at participants’ 
perception of the overall severity of the material weakness as well as their perception of 
the likelihood of a material misstatement in the financial statements. 
 
 Desirability is a composite factor variable made up of three questions that get at 
participants’ willingness to invest in the company, intentions to change their holdings in 
the company given they owned stock, and predictions of future stock price movements. 
 
 Path 1 represents the effect of ICFR Terminology on Desirability through Number of 
Problems and Severity. 
 
 Path 2 represents the effect of ICFR Terminology on Desirability through Individual 
Severity and Severity. 
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 The 95 percent confidence intervals of both indirect effects tested (a x c x e and b x d x 
e) are two tailed. 
 
 The indirect paths are tested using 10,000 bootstrapped samples to create bias-corrected 
confidence intervals. 
 
 The total effect of ICFR Terminology on Desirability is significantly negative 
(p=0.039). The direct effect, controlling for indirect effects, is not significant 
(p=0.379).  
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TABLE 1 
Study 1: Test of H1: Problems
a 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics – Mean (Standard Deviation) [Sample Size] 
 Structure 
 Top Down Bottom Up Paragraph 
No Instruction -0.200 0.264 0.080 
(0.773) (0.668) (0.653) 
[22] [18] [22] 
Cell A 
 
Cell C Cell E 
Instruction 0.389 0.120 0.151 
(0.499) (0.735) (0.720) 
[20] [21] [19] 
Cell B 
 
Cell D Cell F 
Panel B: ANOVA Model
b 
  
Source 
Sum of 
Squares 
 
df 
Mean  
Square 
 
F 
 
p-value 
 
 Structure 0.189 1 0.189 0.408 0.525  
 Instruction 0.994 1 0.994 2.143 0.147  
 Structure × Instruction 2.709 1 2.709 5.843 0.009 * 
 Error 
 
35.701 77 0.464    
Panel C: Simple Effects       
  Bottom 
Up 
 Top 
Down 
 t-value 
(p-value) 
 
 No Instruction 
 
0.264  -0.200  2.15 
(0.018) 
 
* 
 Instruction 
 
0.120  0.389  1.27 
(0.208) 
 
 
* Directional prediction, p-value is based on one-tailed test  
a 
The dependent variable Problems is the composite factor score based on participants’ 
agreement with the following two statements: “Griffin mainly faces one issue within their 
internal controls” and “Griffin mainly faces multiple, distinct issues within their internal 
controls”, on a scale from 0 (“Definitely disagree”) to 10 (“Definitely agree”). 
 
b 
Mean square error and degrees of freedom used to calculate the F statistics are based on the 2 
× 2 ANOVA with Structure (Bottom Up and Top Down) and Instruction (Instruction or No 
Instruction) as independent variables. 
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TABLE 2 
Study 2: Test of H3: Severity
a 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics – Mean (Standard Deviation) [Sample Size] 
  ICFR Terminology 
 
Issues Significant Deficiencies 
Significant 
Deficiencies 
with 
Instruction 
Top Down -0.581 -.001 0.196 
(1.047) (0.592) (0.814) 
[13] [12] [20] 
Cell A 
 
Cell C Cell E 
Bottom Up -.487 0.108 0.103 
(0.924) (0.763) (0.764) 
[15] [16] [25] 
Cell B Cell D Cell F 
 Total -0.530 
(0.966) 
[28] 
0.061 
(0.685) 
[28] 
0.144 
(0.779) 
[45] 
Panel B: ANOVA Model
b 
 Source Sum of 
Squares 
 
df 
Mean 
Square 
 
F 
 
p-value 
 
 ICFR Terminology 4.763 1 4.763 6.569 0.013  
 Structure 0.141 1 0.141 0.195 0.661  
 ICFR Terminology x Structure 0.001 1 0.001 0.001 0.487 * 
 Error 
 
37.703 52 0.725    
* Directional prediction, p-value is one-tailed 
a 
Severity is a composite factor variable made up of two questions that get at participants’ 
perception of the overall severity of the material weakness as well as their perception of the 
likelihood of a material misstatement in the financial statements. 
b 
Based on the 2x2 ANOVA for cells A, B, C, and D (instruction cells excluded). 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
ANNECDOTAL EXAMPLES OF STRUCTURE AND TERMINOLOGY 
Excerpt from A123 Systems, Inc.’s 2011 ICFR Report (Top Down/ ICFR Terminology) 
We have not designed or maintained effective internal controls over the financial 
statement close and reporting process. Such controls are necessary to ensure the accurate 
and timely preparation of financial statements in accordance with Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles. The following deficiencies contribute to the material weakness: 
 we have had significant turnover in several key financial roles, including Chief 
Finance Officer and Chief Accounting Officer. The new finance team has not had 
sufficient time to complete the reorganization of the finance and accounting 
departments, train employees on their new roles and responsibilities, and design 
and implement all controls necessary to mitigate the risk of a material 
misstatement, 
 our design and implementation of certain controls are incomplete or overly reliant 
on manual reviews and we had insufficient time to determine if controls 
developed throughout 2011 were implemented and operating effectively,  
 we have not yet designed and implemented certain key information technology 
controls, including controls in certain manufacturing locations, access controls, 
and change management controls; and the departure of our Chief Information 
Officer further delayed the design and implementation of these controls, 
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 we have not designed and implemented key controls to ensure the timely 
communications of operating issues that could have a material impact on our 
financial statements and disclosures, 
 we did not perform an adequate fraud risk assessment or design and maintain a 
comprehensive, enterprise-wide fraud risk management program to sufficiently 
mitigate our fraud risks and exposures.  
These deficiencies collectively result in a reasonable possibility that a material 
misstatement in our annual or interim consolidated financial statements may not be 
prevented or detected on a timely basis. 
Excerpt from China Direct Industries, Inc.’s 2011 ICFR Report (Bottom Up/ICFR 
Terminology) 
Based on that evaluation solely as a result of the significant deficiencies in our internal 
control over financial reporting identified in our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the 
fiscal year ended September 30, 2011, our management, including our CEO and CFO, 
concluded that our disclosure controls and procedures were not effective as of June 30, 
2011.  
The specific significant deficiencies identified by our management were as follows: 
 A lack of a fully integrated corporate-wide financial accounting system, 
 A lack of qualified accounting personnel who have sufficient knowledge in 
dealing with the complex U.S. GAAP accounting and financial issues in our cross 
border operations. 
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Excerpt from NII Holdings, Inc.’s 2010 ICFR Report (Top Down/non-ICFR 
Terminology) 
The errors in recording VAT expense and the reporting in our press release of the 
revenue-based tax credits without sufficient supporting documentation were not material 
and did not require adjustments to, or restatements of, our financial statements for the 
prior periods; nevertheless, we determined that our controls were not effective at 
preventing what could have been material errors in our financial statements. Accordingly, 
we concluded that circumstances identified below as underlying factors contributing to 
these errors in recording VAT expense and the reporting in our press release of the 
revenue-based tax credits without sufficient supporting documentation constitute a 
material weakness in our internal controls over financial reporting. The Company has 
completed an assessment related to the control failure and the underlying factors 
contributing to the errors in recording VAT expense identified in the fourth quarter of 
2010 and the improper reporting of revenue-based tax credits identified in the third 
quarter of 2010 in our Brazil operating segment. These factors, which relate solely to our 
Brazil operating segment, include:  
 understaffing and turnover of personnel in key job functions within the 
accounting department 
 lack of documentation of key procedures related to the financial close process;  
 insufficient training for newly hired personnel; and 
 underinvestment in systems resulting in increased and inappropriate reliance on 
manual spreadsheets and procedures. 
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In light of the material weakness identified and the underlying factors that increase the 
level of risk related to financial reporting, we have performed additional procedures, 
including reviews and validations by groups other than those performing the financial 
close procedures in our Brazil operating segment, to ensure that the financial results are 
reliable. 
Excerpt from Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co., Inc.’s 2009 ICFR Report (Bottom Up/non-
ICFR Terminology) 
We have made a substantial investment to ensure that the ERP System will provide 
effective internal control over financial reporting, and we have evaluated our controls that 
are not intended to change with the implementation of the ERP System. Because of 
implementation issues encountered, the system was not fully implemented at the “go-
live” date and as a result certain internal controls surrounding the modification, 
processing, retrieving and monitoring of financial data were not fully operational as of 
year end. Additionally, certain financial reporting capabilities were not operational at 
year end which resulted in some controls around the underlying financial data not being 
fully operational or performed on a timely basis. We believe these factors result in a 
material weakness in our internal control over financial reporting and result in an 
assessment of our control environment as ineffective as of the end of the period covered 
by this report. 
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APPENDIX B 
EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATIONS FOR STUDY 1 
Top Down Structure 
As a result of management’s assessment, management identified a material weakness 
related to the following issues: 
 Insufficient Resources – We have an inadequate number of personnel with 
requisite expertise in the key functional areas of finance and accounting. 
 Inadequate Segregation of Duties – We have an inadequate number of 
personnel to properly implement control procedures. 
 Communication Controls – We lack sufficient resources to implement an 
effective communication system, which means we are unable to collect, process 
and deliver information related to internal controls in a timely and precise fashion. 
 Financial Closing Process – We did not have sufficient personnel to perform 
adequate independent review and preparation of the financial statements. 
Bottom Up Structure   
As a result of management’s assessment, management identified following issues: 
 Insufficient Resources – We have an inadequate number of personnel with 
requisite expertise in the key functional areas of finance and accounting. 
 Inadequate Segregation of Duties – We have an inadequate number of 
personnel to properly implement control procedures.  
 Communication Controls – We lack sufficient resources to implement an 
effective communication system, which means we are unable to collect, process 
and deliver information related to internal controls in a timely and precise fashion. 
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 Financial Closing Process – We did not have sufficient personnel to perform 
adequate independent review and preparation of the financial statements. 
The number and nature of these issues, when aggregated, was determined to be a 
material weakness.  
Paragraph Structure 
As a result of management’s assessment, management identified a material weakness 
related to insufficient resources, inadequate segregation of duties, communication 
controls, and the financial closing process. Specifically, we have an inadequate number 
of personnel with requisite expertise in the key functional areas of finance and 
accounting; we have an inadequate number of personnel to properly implement control 
procedures; we lack sufficient resources to implement an effective communication 
system, which means we are unable to collect, process and deliver information related to 
internal controls in a timely and precise fashion; and we did not have sufficient personnel 
to perform adequate independent review and preparation of the financial statements. 
Internal Control Instruction Manipulations 
No Instruction Condition 
[Nothing goes here] 
Instruction Condition 
Several issues that combine to a material weakness are not necessarily any more or less 
severe than a material weakness. What makes a weakness material is not the number of 
issues that make up the material weakness, but whether an issue, or combination of 
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issues, creates a reasonable possibility of material misstatement in the financial 
statements. 
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APPENDIX C 
EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATIONS FOR STUDY 2 
Top Down and Significant Deficiencies (Issues) Conditions 
As a result of management’s assessment, management identified a material weakness 
related to the following significant deficiencies (issues): 
 Insufficient Resources – We have an inadequate number of personnel with 
requisite expertise in the key functional areas of finance and accounting. 
 Inadequate Segregation of Duties – We have an inadequate number of 
personnel to properly implement control procedures. 
 Communication Controls – We lack sufficient resources to implement an 
effective communication system, which means we are unable to collect, process 
and deliver information related to internal controls in a timely and precise fashion. 
 Financial Closing Process – We did not have sufficient personnel to perform 
adequate independent review and preparation of the financial statements. 
Bottom Up and Significant Deficiencies (Issues) Conditions   
As a result of management’s assessment, management identified following significant 
deficiencies (issues): 
 Insufficient Resources – We have an inadequate number of personnel with 
requisite expertise in the key functional areas of finance and accounting. 
 Inadequate Segregation of Duties – We have an inadequate number of 
personnel to properly implement control procedures.  
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 Communication Controls – We lack sufficient resources to implement an 
effective communication system, which means we are unable to collect, process 
and deliver information related to internal controls in a timely and precise fashion. 
 Financial Closing Process – We did not have sufficient personnel to perform 
adequate independent review and preparation of the financial statements. 
The number and nature of these significant deficiencies (issues), when aggregated, was 
determined to be a material weakness.  
 
Instruction in level of ICFR Terminology Variable 
A significant deficiency is also an issue within internal controls that is generally less 
severe than a material weakness and is only disclosed when individually, or in 
combination, it reaches the severity of a material weakness.  
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APPENDIX D 
 
STUDY 1 RESEARCH INSTRUMENT 
 
EXHIBIT 1 
 
First Screen 
 
 
  
90 
 
EXHIBIT 2 
 
First Screen Continued 
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EXHIBIT 3 
 
Second Screen 
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EXHIBIT 4 
 
Third Screen 
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EXHIBIT 5 
 
Third Screen Continued 
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EXHIBIT 6 
 
Fourth Screen 
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EXHIBIT 7 
 
Fifth Screen No Instruction Conditions 
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EXHIBIT 8 
 
Fifth Screen Instruction Conditions 
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EXHIBIT 9 
 
Sixth Screen Top Down Conditions 
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EXHIBIT 10 
 
Sixth Screen Bottom Up Conditions 
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EXHIBIT 11 
 
Sixth Screen Paragraph Conditions 
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EXHIBIT 12 
 
Seventh Screen 
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EXHIBIT 13 
 
Eighth Screen 
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EXHIBIT 14 
 
Ninth Screen 
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EXHIBIT 15 
 
Tenth Screen 
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EXHIBIT 16 
 
Eleventh Screen 
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EXHIBIT 17 
 
Twelfth Screen Top Down Conditions 
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EXHIBIT 18 
 
Twelfth Screen Bottom Up Conditions 
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EXHIBIT 19 
Twelfth Screen Paragraph Conditions 
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EXHIBIT 20 
Thirteenth Screen 
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EXHIBIT 21 
Thirteenth Screen Continued 
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EXHIBIT 22 
Thirteenth Screen Continued 
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EXHIBIT 23 
 
Fourteenth Screen 
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EXHIBIT 24 
 
Fifteenth Screen 
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APPENDIX E 
 
STUDY 2 RESEARCH INSTRUMENT  
 
EXHIBIT 25 
 
First Screen 
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EXHIBIT 26 
 
Second Screen 
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EXHIBIT 27 
 
Third Screen 
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EXHIBIT 28 
 
Fourth Screen 
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EXHIBIT 29 
 
Fifth Screen No Instruction Conditions 
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EXHIBIT 30 
 
Fifth Screen Instruction Conditions 
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EXHIBIT 31 
 
Sixth Screen Top Down/Non-ICFR Terminology Conditions 
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EXHIBIT 32 
 
Sixth Screen Top Down/ICFR Terminology Conditions 
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EXHIBIT 33 
 
Sixth Screen Bottom Up/Non-ICFR Terminology Conditions 
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EXHIBIT 34 
 
Sixth Screen Bottom Up/ICFR Terminology Conditions 
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EXHIBIT 35 
 
Seventh Screen 
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EXHIBIT 36 
 
Eighth Screen 
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EXHIBIT 37 
 
Ninth Screen 
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EXHIBIT 38 
 
Tenth Screen 
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EXHIBIT 39 
 
Eleventh Screen 
 
 
  
128 
 
EXHIBIT 40 
 
Twelfth Screen 
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EXHIBIT 41 
 
Thirteenth Screen 
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EXHIBIT 42 
 
Fourteenth Screen 
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EXHIBIT 43 
 
Fifteenth Screen Top Down/Non-ICFR Terminology Conditions 
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EXHIBIT 44 
 
Fifteenth Screen Bottom Up/Non-ICFR Terminology Conditions 
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EXHIBIT 45 
 
Fifteenth Screen Top Down/ICFR Terminology Conditions 
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EXHIBIT 46 
 
Fifteenth Screen Bottom Up/ICFR Terminology Conditions 
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EXHIBIT 47 
 
Sixteenth Screen 
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EXHIBIT 48 
 
Sixteenth Screen Continued 
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EXHIBIT 49 
 
Sixteenth Screen Continued 
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EXHIBIT 50 
 
Seventeenth Screen 
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EXHIBIT 51 
 
Eighteenth Screen 
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